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Article 3

THE MORAL HAZARD OF CONTRACT DRAFTING
ERIC A. ZACKS 
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies and examines the principal-agent problem as it arises in the context of contract preparation. The economic agency relationship, as it may be understood to
exist for contract drafting, provides a superior framework for understanding and reforming
the inability of the non-drafting party (the principal) to control the drafting party (the
agent). As an economic agent, the drafting party faces a moral hazard when preparing the
contract because of the differing interests of the parties as well as the information and control asymmetries that exists. For example, the use of standard form contracts in consumer
transactions is an example of the drafting party being motivated and able to act in the
drafting party’s favor without detection or resistance by the non-drafting party. To date,
contract law reforms typically have focused on the non-drafting party’s ability to monitor
and attempted to alleviate information and control asymmetries, with suboptimal results.
Economic theory, however, not only helps explain these failures but also suggests superior
reforms. Reforms should be focused on realigning the interests of the two parties instead of
remedying the problems that emanate from such misalignment. More specifically, reforms
should incentivize drafting parties to devote resources to determining how to make effective
disclosure of contract terms and penalize drafting parties when they do not.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that contract reforms for standard form contracts, while implicitly recognizing the moral hazard faced by contract drafting parties, have improperly focused on improving the ability of non-drafting parties to monitor drafting parties to improve
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their contracts and not on changing the fundamental incentives of
drafting parties to prepare one-sided contracts that are difficult to
comprehend. Scholars recognize that “repeat players” may prepare
standard form contracts in a particularly advantageous manner because they know that the non-drafting party (the principal) typically
will not read or otherwise be able to detect or counteract such behavior.1 Similarly, scholars suggest that standard form contracts may be
designed in part to take advantage of particular cognitive biases and
judgment heuristics of the non-drafting party.2
Unfortunately, most contract law reforms for standard form contracts have focused on alleviating the symptoms of the problematic
relationship between parties to a standard form contract instead of
the cause. In particular, reforms focus on improving the ability of the
non-drafting party or courts to detect and control opportunistic contract drafting behavior. For example, mandated disclosure and the
unconscionability doctrine are systematic reforms that attempt to
alleviate the pre-formation information and control asymmetries that
exist between the drafting party and non-drafting party. Mandated
disclosure of particular terms (in particular language or formats)
theoretically improves the ability of non-drafting parties to understand the terms of the contracts they are signing (and to refuse to
sign when such terms are undesirable), while unconscionability enables non-drafting parties and courts to detect and punish drafting
parties that take unfair advantage of the bargaining process.
These reforms have failed in part because they do not fundamentally change the misalignment of interests between the drafting party and the non-drafting party, specifically the desire of the drafting
party to obtain the most advantageous terms through a strategically
designed contract. These reforms also fail because they are based on
a faulty assumption that the non-drafting party or the other monitors, such as legislatures or adjudicators, are capable of determining
what constitutes effective disclosure without cooperation from the
1. This is typically presented as a problem in terms of an information asymmetry or
the cost to the consumer of acquiring the information. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L.
REV. 583, 598 (1990) (“Some sellers attempt to increase this cost [of acquiring information]
through the use of fine print or obscure placement. Even without these additional obstacles, the sheer number of terms to be analyzed in the typical form contract imposes too
great a burden for the consumer.”) (footnote omitted).
2. Instead of being strictly based on information gaps or information costs, the problems of standard form contracts may be based upon the imperfect rationality of individuals.
See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 21 (2012) (“The behavioral-economics
theory of contract design is an imperfect-rationality theory, not an imperfect-information
theory.”); Trond Petersen, Recent Developments in: The Economics of Organization: The
Principal-Agent Relationship, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 277, 289 (1993) (suggesting that the
“agency framework [in the mathematical literature] would be strengthened by taking the
notion of bounded rationality seriously”).
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drafting party. Importantly, although these reforms are directed at
improving the contract formation process through specific ex ante
requirements (mandated disclosure) or general bargaining parameters (unconscionability), these requirements or defenses typically are
invoked only after consent to the contract purportedly was given and
a presumption of enforceability exists. Accordingly, the drafting party
enjoys all the benefits of obtaining the non-drafting party’s dubious
consent, while the non-drafting party faces the burden of rebutting
the presumed enforceability of such consent. Such reforms consequently fail to change the interests or behavior of the drafting parties
in the standard form contract context.
This Article suggests that the task of contract preparation should
be analyzed in terms of economic agency. Economic agency provides a
more complete and nuanced understanding of the contract drafting
relationship because it does not focus solely on the limitations on the
non-drafting party or others to monitor the drafting party that permit the drafting party to draft one-sided contracts. Instead, it also
identifies the reason that such limitations matter, namely the different interests of the parties. Rather than focusing on and trying to
remedy the vulnerability of the drafting parties, economic agency
suggests that by realigning the interests of the parties, the asymmetries of information and control can be rendered more benign.
Viewed in terms of economic agency, the drafting party can be understood to be the economic agent of the non-drafting party with respect to the task of preparing the contract. This relationship necessarily suffers from the principal-agent problem, meaning that dichotomies of interests, information, and control exist between the parties.
These dichotomies may encourage and permit the drafting party to
obtain a more advantageous contract in certain contexts, such as the
use of standard form contracts in consumer transactions. The existing critiques of problematic legal consent to contract thus can be understood as attacking the issues that stem from the economic agency
relationship between the parties concerning the form and content of
the written contract. Without the ability to observe and control the
agent preparing the contract, the principal that signs the contract
may have little ability to control the contents of the contract. Contract law scholars have implicitly understood this.
As an example, credit card agreements have been criticized for
insufficient disclosure of important terms, such as late fees or default
interest rates, which (in part) prompted the passage of a federal act
to address such deficiencies.3 These agreements may exist as they do
3. See BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 81 (noting that “there is evidence that the high
level of complexity was a deliberate design feature of the credit card contract”); Eric A.
Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1478 (2010) (“Current weaknesses in the disclosures contained in or
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because the credit card companies are able to prepare contracts with
such favorable terms and the principal (the consumer) is unable to
detect such characteristics or, more significantly, able to respond rationally to such characteristics.4 Consumers may not be able to understand credit card agreements’ disclosure of late fees or other fees
because of the complexity of such arrangements, and even if they do,
they may inaccurately assess whether they will ever incur such fees.5
Scholars’ criticisms of such agreements now may be better understood in terms of the moral hazard that exists when one party is able
to prepare the contract on behalf of the other without oversight or
resistance by the other.
Similarly, scholars have criticized certain standard form contracts
that secure legal consent using such questionable techniques as “rolling contracts” and other types of relatively passive acceptance by the
consumer.6 Such “legal consent” has been attacked as not being significant because the consumer has limited options to act to counteract such a contract.7 For example, if the consumer reads the contract
accompanying credit card agreements also suggest that Issuers prepare such agreements
in their favor in an attempt to maximize profits.”).
4. As an example, Bar-Gill suggests that consumers’ perceptions of price can be manipulated. BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 15 (“[C]ontract design is used to minimize the perceived total price by amplifying the effect of product-use mistakes.”).
5. BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 53 (“Complexity plays into the imperfect rationality of
cardholders. . . . Increased complexity may be attractive to issuers, as it allows them to
hide the true cost of the credit card in a multidimensional pricing maze.”).
6. See, e.g., NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS 53-69 (2013) (addressing, in detail, the
problematic issues arising from the use of “wrap contracts”). “Rolling contracts” are contracts where additional contractual terms and conditions are delivered with or after product delivery (but after basic agreement regarding the transaction). Clayton P. Gillette,
Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 681 (2004) (describing how
rolling contracts “essentially permit parties to reach agreement over basic terms, such as
price and quantity, but leave until a later time, . . . the presentation of additional terms
that the buyer can accept, often by simply using the good, or reject, by returning it”).
7. If the party is not in a position to understand and counter the terms, then any
apparent assent to the contract is meaningfully weakened. Accordingly, the “standard
analysis in SFC [standard form contract] cases is that because the recipient of terms cannot be reasonably expected to negotiate, review, or fully comprehend [standard form contracts] that are drafted by more sophisticated and self-interested sellers, the effectiveness
of alleged contract terms becomes a matter for judicial scrutiny.” Gillette, supra note 6, at
680-81. Moreover, the delivery method may intentionally impair the non-drafting party’s
ability to respond to such terms. See Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 735-41 (2004) (describing how purposely delivering standard
terms after the product has been sold and delivered “increase[s] the likelihood that the
vendor will be able to obtain both its terms and a price greater than what the buyer may
have been willing to pay had the terms been disclosed up front”); cf. Randy E. Barnett,
Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002) (“When one clicks ‘I
agree’ to the terms on the box [of a license agreement on a web site], does one usually know
what one is doing? Absolutely. There is no doubt whatsoever that one is objectively manifesting one’s assent to the terms in the box, whether or not one has read them. The same
observation applies to signatures on form contracts.”).
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delivered with the purchased goods (a “rolling contract”) and decides
that the agreement as prepared is unacceptable, it may be very expensive to return the purchased merchandise, or there may be decision-making biases that will inhibit such a return (such as the endowment effect associated with possession of the product).8 The limited or expensive options available to the consumer or the tendency of
a consumer to accept passively a written contract, however, now can
be understood as limitations on the ability of a principal to control an
agent’s actions even when detected. The drafting party (the economic
agent), consequently, is incentivized to enhance and exploit these
limitations to the drafting party’s personal benefit by preparing a
particular type of contract (with favorable terms) and delivery system
intended to induce assent.
To some extent, the drafting party and the non-drafting party
have irreconcilable interests because the contract will dictate the
terms of their future relationship, and to the extent that a term is
favorable to one party, the other party is correspondingly disadvantaged. The interests to be realigned, instead, must be the interests
with respect to detection and comprehension of the material terms of
the contract. The drafting party would prefer that the non-drafting
party be unable and unwilling to detect disadvantageous terms, while
the non-drafting party would prefer to be able to detect such terms.
Accordingly, contract law reforms must utilize tools that incentivize the drafting party to make effective disclosure of disadvantageous
terms. Importantly, these tools must not rely on ad hoc or stale determinations of what constitutes effective disclosure by legislatures,
judges, or even the non-drafting parties themselves. As an example,
the presumption of enforceability with respect to contract terms in
standard form contracts could and should be reversed. Under such a
regime, drafting parties would be forced to demonstrate that the disclosure in standard form contracts is effective. Shifting the burden to
the drafting parties to deploy resources with respect to effective disclosure reduces the incentive for disclosing parties to obscure or confuse with respect to particular contract terms and aligns the parties’
interests. To that end, improper disclosure would put drafting parties
at a competitive disadvantage instead of an advantage, as improperly
drafted contracts would not be enforced. Limiting court review to
whether drafting parties can demonstrate empirically that a contract
made effective disclosure of its terms also reduces the possibility of
legislative or adjudicative error.

8. For example, the endowment effect may deter the party from returning the product if the contract terms are not delivered until after the product has already been delivered. Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1653-54 (2006).
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of
the economic conception of the principal-agent problem and how it
can be understood to exist when one contracting party is empowered
to prepare the written contract. It then addresses implications of the
principal-agent problem within the contract preparation context.
Part III of this Article then explains how economic agency theory
helps us understand which contracts are problematic as well as why
particular contract law reforms have not achieved success. Part III
also proposes a different set of reforms designed to address the differing interests of the parties instead of focusing on the asymmetries of
information and control that can be exploited. By realigning the
drafting party’s desire to receive advantageous terms with the nondrafting party’s interest in understanding disadvantageous terms,
contract law reforms can promote effective disclosure. Part IV concludes that the model of the economic agency relationship as it exists
in the contract preparation context, including the associated principal-agent problem, not only provides an important analytical tool for
contact law scholars but also important solutions for addressing gaps
in contract preparation and formation.
II. ECONOMIC AGENCY AND CONTRACT LAW
For economic purposes, an agency relationship is created when
one party (the “agent”) is empowered to complete a task on behalf of
another (the “principal”).9 Economic agency should be distinguished
from the legal status of agency and the associated duties and liability
arising from such status.10 Generally, legal agency is only created if
the agent has been empowered with enough discretion to modify the
legal relations of the principal and if the principal has enough control
9. GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE REGULATION AND THE REGULATION OF INCENTIVES
7 (1994) (The principal-agent “relationship arises when one party, the principal, employs
another party, the agent, to perform some task”); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory:
An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (“[A]gency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates
work to another (the agent), who performs that work.”).
10. Part of the distinction between the two types of agency is based on the assumption
regarding whether a trust or fiduciary relationship exists. In legal agency relationships,
one party is understood to be standing in some sort of fiduciary relationship, meaning one
where the party has been empowered, presumably based on trust, to act on behalf of the
other party. By contrast, “economic models of agency have tended to assume an absence of
trust, focusing instead on moral hazard and adverse selection.” Ramon CasadesusMasanell, Trust in Agency, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 375, 375 (2004). Although there
is obvious overlap between the two conceptions, the law of agency arose before the economic literature concerning principal-agency problems. See ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 89, 93 (2d ed. 2010). Given the lack of overlap in origins
and assumptions, it is not surprising that the legal solutions to agency (legal or economic)
problems have been different. Indeed, this Article is an attempt to reconcile ways in which
economic understandings of agency may supplement the legal gaps that are based on only
a fiduciary notion of agency.
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over the time and manner in which the agent completes her task.11
Thus, legal agents typically are economic agents, but economic
agents are not necessarily legal agents.12
Importantly, the drafting party, if also a signatory and party to
the contract, would not be considered a legal agent of the nondrafting party with respect to the task of preparing the contract. For
example, the drafting party does not owe the fiduciary duties associated with being a legal agent, such as the duty to disclose all relevant
information to the other party or to act in the best interests of the
other contract party, to the contract party regarding the contract, its
preparation, or its contents.13 Instead, the burden and responsibility
for the contents of the contract lie almost exclusively with the party
executing the contract.14 Indeed, contract law imposes a duty to read
upon the party signing the contract, which is in accord with the idea
that the drafting party is acting on her own behalf and not as a legal
agent of the other party.15 This Article is primarily concerned, however, with the economic (and not legal) conception of agency and how
it informs the preparation of contracts.16

11. Generally, the legal agent has to be empowered to act on behalf of the principal
with respect to third parties. See, e.g., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber,
Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45, 88 (2005) (“The definition of
agency in economics departs considerably from the legal definition. . . . In economics, the
agent often is a subordinate employee who performs a productive task for the
principal. . . . Yet the legal definition of agency is clear—an agent is a representative sent
by the principal to represent the interests of the principal in transactions with third parties.”).
12. Because legal agency requires specific types of powers to be granted to the agent
and specific amounts of control to be retained by the principal, the economic conception of
agency is necessarily broader than the legal concept. See Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761
A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000) (“[A]gency [for legal purposes] results only if there is an agreement for the creation of a fiduciary relationship with control by the beneficiary.” (quoting
Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. 1971))); CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 10, at 89
(comparing the legal conception of economic agency to the economic conception).
13. These obligations, if they exist at all, would be derived from common law concepts
or statutory requirements (as opposed to a legal agency relationship). See CHIAPPINELLI,
supra note 10, at 95 (“The [legal] agent is a fiduciary to the principal, which means that
the agent has higher duties than the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing ordinarily found in a contractual setting.”).
14. Courts expect parties to have read and understood the contracts that they have
signed and generally hold them liable under unread contract. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond
Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 476 (2008) (“As
a corollary to finding assent to contract formation, traditional contract doctrine imposes on
the parties a ‘duty to read.’ ”).
15. The duty to read means “[a] party that signs an agreement is regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having read or understood it.” E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (4th ed. 2004).
16. As such, any references to “agency” or “agents” in this Article should be understood (unless otherwise specified) as describing economic, not legal, agency relationships.
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A. An Overview of the Principal-Agent Problem
A much-discussed issue with the creation of any sort of agency relationship is the “principal-agent” problem.17 The principal-agent
problem stems from the differences between the motivations and interests of the parties and the accompanying asymmetries of information and control.18 If the interests of the parties are different, and
the agent has better information and more control over the agent’s
performance, then the agent may face a “moral hazard” and be inclined to act in the agent’s best interest at the expense of the principal (without the principal being able to detect or counteract such behavior).19 Each of these basic factors will be addressed briefly in turn.
As to the parties’ respective interests, the principal generally
would prefer the agent to complete the task using the highest quality
and efficiency at the minimum cost to the principal.20 The agent, on
17. BLACKMON, supra note 9, at 7 (noting that “[t]he principal-agent relationship gives
rise to the principal-agent problem and to an entire literature of information economics”)
(emphasis omitted).
18. Eisenhardt, supra note 9, at 58 (describing the “agency problem that arises when
(a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing”); Douglas E. Stevens & Alex
Thevaranjan, A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem, 35 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 125,
125 (2010) (The principal-agent “model raises expectations about the occurrence of selfinterested behavior and the usefulness of financial incentives in solving the moral hazard
problem.”).
19. As used in this Article, the term “moral hazard” will be used to refer to the problem faced by an economic agent when the agent has the ability to act (undetected) in the
agent’s personal interests to the detriment of the principal. See BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 107 (2d ed. 2005) (“We speak of moral hazard when the Agent
takes a decision (‘action’) that affects his utility and that of the Principal; the Principal
only observes the ‘outcome,’ an imperfect signal of the action taken; [and] the action the
Agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto-optimal.”); Jörg Guido Hülsmann, The
Political Economy of Moral Hazard, 1 CZECH J. POLITICKÁ EKONOMIE 35, 35 (2006) (citing
Y. Kotowitz, The Moral Hazard, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 549
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 1987)) (“Moral hazard is present in ‘actions of economic
agents […] to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences […] of their actions.’ ”). Although used in this broader sense for the purpose of this
Article, “moral hazard has never been a straightforward, purely logical or scientific concept.” Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996).
Baker traces the development of the term “moral hazard” from its uses in the insurance
industry in the 1800s to the generalization of the concept to encompass all relationships
that involve risk. Importantly, beginning with the exchanges between Kenneth Arrow (who
applied the concept of moral hazard to the economics of the U.S. health care system) and
Mark Pauly, there has been disagreement regarding whether morality is relevant at all to
“moral hazard” or whether it is merely a question of incentives. Id. at 268. Without wanting to wade too far into the debate but still wanting to use the term as a shorthand to describe effectively the situation of an economic agent with superior information and control,
this Article uses the term moral hazard (based on the differing interests and incentives of
the agent in such a situation) without regard to whether actions taken by the agent might
be or are in fact immoral.
20. Principals are inclined to try to extract as much benefit from the economic agent
at the lowest cost, which may include ratcheting, which means attempting to add additional and uncontracted for tasks to the economic agent without additional compensation. See
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the other hand, generally would like to complete the task using the
minimum effort while extracting the maximum compensation from
the principal or otherwise profiting from the task and any associated
opportunities.21
This differential in interests is problematic based on disparities in
the parties’ relative information and control. First, the principal has
less and probably worse information ex ante about whether the agent
is capable of performing the task with the desired quality and in the
desired time frame.22 In addition, the agent likely will have superior
information regarding, both during and after the performance period,
whether the agent performed the task as and when desired.23
CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 10, at 90 (“Measured strictly from the principal’s economic best
interest, principals have an incentive to ratchet because they get the desired task performed at a lower cost.”).
21. The interests of the agent are just the mirror image of the desires of the principal.
See Hülsmann, supra note 19, at 37 (“The agent, who is fully informed about his own activities, has an incentive to act in his own material interest against the material interests of
his less informed principal.”). There are other differences between the parties, of course.
The profile of principals and agents may be different as well. Agents may be more riskaverse as the party with more to lose (by ending up with a suboptimal result associated
with riskier choices) than the principal as the party with more to gain (by ending up with a
result above the desired level associated with riskier choices). Other differences may arise
because of the different profile of the agent prior to and after contract formation. See Stevens & Thevaranjan, supra note 18, at 125 (“In the most basic case, a risk-neutral principal offers a risk-free wage to a risk-averse agent to perform a productive effort, and the
agent accepts the offer as long as the wage adequately compensates him for the effort. After accepting the offer, however, the agent prefers to shirk and provide less than the
agreed-upon level of effort because he is assumed to be effort-averse and morally insensitive (i.e., opportunistically self-interested).”).
22. Because of this disparity in information, agents may be able to misrepresent their
qualifications to the principals. This problem, known as adverse selection, can be costly to
the principal even if the principal is in a position to detect poor performance once the agent
has been engaged. See INÉS MACHO-STADLER & J. DAVID PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS 11 (Richard Watt trans., 2d ed. 2001) (noting that in “adverse selection” problems, “the principal
can verify the agent’s behaviour, but the optimal decision, or the cost of this decision, depends on the agent’s type, that is, on certain characteristics of the production process of
which the agent is the only informed party . . . [including] personal characteristics of
the agent”).
23. One of the reasons that agents are often employed is because the principal is unable or unwilling to become intimately involved with the task. See Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral
Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) (“The source of this moral hazard or incentive problem is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results
because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon.”). The principal
may be unwilling to invest the time necessary to monitor the agent while performing or the
money necessary to determine whether the agent in fact did a good job. See BLACKMON,
supra note 9, at 7 (describing the principal-agent problem in terms of the ability of the
agent to “take some actions that further his interests at the expense of the principal’s interests. . . . It is difficult (i.e., expensive) to monitor or verify the behavior of the agent”).
For example, it may be difficult to determine whether the performance of an individual
employee (an economic agent) was good or bad with respect to a project with which many
employees were involved. See Petersen, supra note 2, at 278 (“The principal-agent relationship is interesting when (a) there is some uncertainty in the way the agent’s action gets
transformed into the output, and (b) there is asymmetrical information, for example, the
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As a result of the asymmetries of information, the agent also may
have more control over whether the agent performs as and when desired by the principal.24 The agent has been empowered to perform
the task by the principal, presumably because the principal believed
it was more expedient to have someone else perform the task; thus, it
necessarily follows that the agent will have some level of independence from the principal to perform the task and, therefore, to have
more information about the agent’s performance.25 The agent will
therefore determine how and when the task is performed, including
modifying the task’s performance based on changing conditions.
As a result of these asymmetries of interests, information, and
control, agents face a moral hazard and, accordingly, may be inclined
and incentivized to act in a number of ways that are below the desired performance level.26 First, agents may shirk by performing the
task at a level below the quality desired by the principal (and expend
less time and effort as a result, which is a benefit enjoyed solely by
the agent).27 The agent may be able to do so because the principal
agent (e.g. a worker) observes her own action, but the principal (e.g. an employer) does not
observe the action of the agent. The principal can then not be sure whether the agent acts
in the principal’s best interest.”).
24. Because the agent often is an expert, the principal is going to have to rely on the
agent’s judgment and determination of performance. See Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber,
supra note 11, at 72 (“The agent is often a specialist on the task he has been hired to perform, having a comparative advantage if not an absolute advantage relative to the principal, giving the agent greater capacity to process information and determine the most desirable course of action.”).
25. As noted by Arrow, “by definition the agent has been selected for his specialized
knowledge and therefore the principal can never hope completely to check the agent’s performance. You cannot therefore easily take out insurance against the failure of the agent to
perform well.” Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 537, 538 (1968). For example, the amount of information the employer has
about the effort made by the employee is limited and difficult to verify. Pablo Arocena et
al., Why Are Firms Challenging Conventional Wisdom on Moral Hazard? Revisiting the
Fair Wage–Effort Hypothesis, 20 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 433, 434 (2010) (“In this situation, information asymmetries may give the employee incentives to behave inappropriately
from the perspective of the employer . . . .”).
26. In the absence of effective deterrence, the economics models of the agency relationship suggest that the agent will act opportunistically and in her own personal interests. Hülsmann, supra note 19, at 37 (“Whenever the principal cannot effectively monitor
the activities of his agent, therefore, the latter has an incentive to increase his own (monetary and psychic) income at the expense of the former.”); Peter Wright et. al., A Reexamination of Agency Theory Assumptions: Extensions and Extrapolations, 30 J. SOCIO-ECON. 413,
415 (2001) (noting that “the expectation is that economic actors may disguise, mislead,
distort, or cheat as they partner in an exchange”). This model is based on the idea that
agents are motivated generally to maximize their personal gains. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always
act in the best interests of the principal.”).
27. Shirking is a somewhat unobvious way of acting in one’s own personal interests
because the agent is not necessarily receiving additional benefits from having “shirked.”
See Eisenhardt, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that the agent may simply not put forth the
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cannot detect that the agent is doing so nor control (without the benefit of such information) the agent from doing otherwise.28 For example, a painter may only paint a house with one coat of paint (instead
of two, as may have been desired by the homeowner) if the painter
believes that the homeowner will be unable to detect the quality difference between one or two coats of paint (or to monitor the painter
while she paints).29 This shirking saves the painter from having to
spend the time painting the second coat or incur the cost of purchasing more paint for the second coat, while the painter presumably will
still charge the principal for a “completed” task.
An agent may also act directly against the interests of the principal by taking property or benefits that belonged (or should have belonged) to the principal for the agent’s own benefit.30 The opportunity
to secure these “private benefits” arises because, again, the principal
cannot detect the agent is doing so, and the agent has the information and control to be able to identify the opportunity and seize
upon it. In the house-painting example, the painter could take some
of the paint paid for by the homeowner and use it for her own house
(without paying for it). The painter also might be able to utilize other
personal property of the homeowner for her own benefit (such as eating
the homeowner’s food) while permitted on the homeowner’s premises.
The principal is not necessarily powerless to address the asymmetries of information and control described above. Principals often incur costs in order to address the principal-agent problem and reduce
the risk that the agent will engage in shirking or other problematic,
opportunistic behavior.31 These agency costs can include ex ante costs
agreed-upon effort—that is, the agent is shirking). Instead, shirking is acting opportunistically because the agent may be compensated as if the principal’s desired level of effort had
been expended, even though it had not. Accordingly, in this sense, the agent is receiving
additional financial rewards, at least relative to the actual output of effort. BLACKMON,
supra note 9, at 7-8 (“It is tempting and easy to make judge the agent to be ‘bad’ in this
situation . . . . Often the shorthand description of the agent’s behavior carries this negative
connotation. The agent may ‘shirk,’ engage in ‘slack,’ or . . . engage in ‘abuse.’ ”).
28. Accordingly, there is a direct link between observability and opportunistic behavior. See SALANIÉ, supra note 19, at 119 (“Because the action is unobservable, the Principal
cannot force the Agent to choose an action that is Pareto-optimal.”); BLACKMON, supra note
9, at 8 (noting that “the agent does not profit from his opportunity to shirk, slack, or abuse
as long as the principal anticipates the agents opportunity to so behave”).
29. Agents could commit fraud as well when a principal has explicitly charged an
agent with the details of the task and the agent ignores those details to the extent that the
principal is unable to detect such malfeasance.
30. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 10, at 91 (“The second moral hazard that principals face
is the risk that the agent will use his or her discretion opportunistically to obtain private
benefits for which the agent will bear only part (or even none) of the cost.”).
31. These costs can be incurred either by monitoring agents (or hiring others to monitor) or implementing financial incentives, both of which methods are designed to deter
opportunistic behavior by the agent. Charles W. L. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, StakeholderAgency Theory, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 132 (“According to agency theory, the principal can
limit divergence from his/her interests by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent,
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incurred to screen potential agents for qualification as well as costs
incurred during the time of or after performance to ascertain whether
the agent performed as desired.32 Contracts exist in part to detect
and constrain opportunistic actions of one of the contractual promissors (an economic agent of the other with respect to a particular
promised task).33 Contracts are distinct from other creations of economic agency relationships because the contract provides a legally
enforceable remedy to the promissee (the principal) if the promissor’s
obligations specified in the contract (i.e., the agent’s tasks) are not
and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit opportunistic action by the agent.”).
These costs are known as “agency costs” and represent an overall loss to the principal. Id.
(“The sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the agent’s bonding expenditures,
and any remaining residual loss are defined as agency costs.”).
32. Accordingly, agents could be deterred either through detection and rejection of
improperly qualified agents at the commencement of the relationship as well as additional
monitoring of performance and outcome-based incentives. See Arocena et al., supra note 25,
at 434 (noting that “the conventional solution to moral hazard is to align the incentives of
all players through strict monitoring of the agent’s behavior and incentive packages linked
to the fulfillment of the principal’s interests”). Some have suggested focusing on noneconomic means to address the principal-agent problem. See, e.g., Stevens & Thevaranjan,
supra note 18, at 126 (“The possibility for morality or social norms to control self-interest
was raised early on in the development of agency theory but the literature chose to emphasize economic incentive solutions to the moral hazard problem.”(citing Joel S.
Demski & Gerald A. Feltham, Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems, 54 ACCT.
REV. 336, 346-47 (1978))). Although not addressed in this Article, it seems doubtful that
social norms can reform standard form contract drafting practices, and, in fact, the opposite may be true. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 6, at 5 (“In the dynamic online and mobile computing environment the aggressive practices of businesses—accomplished in large part
through wrap contracts— threaten to reshape societal norms and values . . . .”); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 1516 (2013) (suggesting that the use of boilerplate results in the “normative degradation” of
the legal system as well as the elimination of democratically provided rights); see also Arrow, supra note 25, at 538 (suggesting that “[o]ne of the characteristics of a successful economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between principal and agent are
sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be ‘rational economic
behavior’ to do so.”). The absence of trust in certain contract situations, such as transactions between many mass sellers and consumers (who are typically strangers), suggests
that stronger means must be used to detect drafting parties who are acting opportunistically. See infra Part IV for a discussion of reforms suggested by economic agency for this area.
33. Contracts attempt to address these issues in part by providing binding financial
incentives for the agent not to act opportunistically after being engaged to act on the principal’s behalf. See Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 11, at 90 (“Economic analysis
of the agency model seeks to characterize the terms of an optimal agency contract. Because
of moral hazard, the principal must rely on performance based rewards such as bonuses
and commissions to induce the agent to work.”). Designing a contract that provides the
“appropriate” financial incentives is not simple, particularly since the inputs (effort) or
outputs (performance) may be difficult to measure. For example, as for the relationship
between a money manager (an agent) and an investor (a principal), “[t]he investor’s problem then is how to design an optimal compensation contract in light of the moral hazard
and adverse selection problems that arise from the fact that the manager’s quality and
effort as well as the complexity of the available investment opportunities are the manager’s
private information.” Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 268, 268 (2012) (noting that contracts may
not be utilized in common business practices because they are expensive to draft and enforce).
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fulfilled.34 As a result, the contract can provide the principal with the
ability to alleviate the information and control disparities that ordinarily exist.35 The contract can be seen as an attempt, however imperfect, to address the information and control asymmetries between two parties based on known or contemplated differences in
personal interests.36
Thus, there is an existing body of literature that recognizes the
significance of the post-formation contract principal-agent problem
and the moral hazards faced by promisors after they have agreed
contractually to perform. There is also a separate body of literature
that recognizes that contract preparers may design contracts in order
to take advantage of the other parties’ imperfect or incomplete rationality, particularly in the consumer contract context.37 The literature to date, however, has not recognized explicitly that the foundation of these critiques is the principal-agent problem as it may exist
in the context of contract preparation. In other words, addressing the
principal-agent problem between promising parties by entering into a
contract (to alleviate information and control asymmetries that exist
after the contract is signed) creates a new agency problem: the principal-agent problem (and the accompanying moral hazard) associated
with the diverging interests, information, and control that exist for
the task of drafting the contract.
34. The ability of contracts, no matter how detailed, to provide protection against
opportunistic behavior is contested in the literature. See, e.g., Stefan Wuyts & Inge
Geyskens, The Formation of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Detailed Contract Drafting and
Close Partner Selection, 69 J. MKTG. 103, 103 (2005) (“Theoretically, some researchers argue that detailed contract drafting offers a way to protect against the partner’s opportunism through the threat of legal enforcement, whereas others argue that detailed contracts
are seldom used in practice because they are costly to draft and enforce.” (citing Paul L.
Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence
from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168, 169 (1987); Stewart Macaulay, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64-66 (1963))).
35. Hülsmann, supra note 19, at 39 (noting that “principals acting on a free
market . . . are also free to design contracting relationships in ways that minimize: a) the
danger of moral hazard arising in the first place and b) the danger of moral hazard, once
there, affecting them negatively”); Wuyts & Geyskens, supra note 34, at 106 (“Thus,
through clearly articulated clauses, contracts narrow the domain around which parties can
be opportunistic. For example . . . [a] precise statement of how each party is to perform
decreases the likelihood that the partner will hide important performance-related information, such as information about capacity constraints. On the other hand, failing to specify all elements of the exchange contractually increases incentives for short-term
cheating.”).
36. It is understood that agency costs cannot completely eliminate opportunistic behavior of agents. See Wright et al., supra note 26, at 425 (“In spite of contracting, monitoring, and bonding efforts, however, there will still remain ‘some divergence between the
agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.’ ”
(quoting Jensen & Meckling, supra note 26, at 308)).
37. These are often standard form contracts. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 6-43;
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216-44 (2003).
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This Article argues that economic agency literature is instructive
with respect to the situation of contract drafting once the drafting
party is understood or interpreted as the economic agent of the nondrafting party with respect to preparing the contract.38 The next Section discusses the principal-agent problem as it exists for contract
preparation and its manifestations in terms of information asymmetry, control imbalances, and unfair or unexpected results, which
may help explain why contracts are prepared as they are.
B. The Differing Interests of the Contract Parties
As with any agency relationship, the interests of the principal (the
non-drafting party) and the agent (the drafting party) are different,
as they are each seeking to maximize the benefits realized from the
relationship.39 The agent in this instance, however, also happens to
be the party that directly benefits from a particular formulation of
the parties’ legal rights and obligations in the written contract. Thus,
the agent has an interest in a written contract that provides the most
flexibility for the agent, less exposure to potential liability for the
agent, less flexibility for the other party, and a greater exposure to
potential liability for the other party.40 As discussed in the introduction to Part II, contract law assumes that these differing interests
represent a legitimate basis for maximizing gains. It does so by not
imposing a duty upon the drafting party to draft in good faith or to
act as a legal agent with respect to the non-drafting party.
For “repeat players,” these differing interests may be more important since the same contract will potentially be used for many
transactions. Accordingly, if the drafting party is a repeat player
(such as a corporate entity that routinely does business with similarly situated customers), the drafting party also would prefer to have a
contract that has a standard set of terms and conditions which are
well understood by the drafting party and provide consistent legal
results, even if that involves the engagement and expense of profes-

38. Whether the drafting party is, under strict economic theory, an economic agent of
the non-drafting party is not addressed in this Article. This Article instead focuses on
whether the economic agency literature helps illuminate certain problems that arise from
strategic contract drafting and suggests alternative reforms.
39. As discussed in Part I supra, each party is different, will have different interests,
and will be motivated to act in her own interests. See BLACKMON, supra note 9, at 7 (“The
interests of the principal and the agent are different; each seeks to maximize his own reward, however measured.”). Accordingly, when one assents to a contract, her choice might
be understood as manifesting an accurate determination that the terms of that contract
fulfill those interests. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 714-15. This Part will discuss why that
premise is untrue for particular contracts.
40. See Korobkin, supra note 37, at 1216-44 (arguing that drafting parties are incentivized, including by the market, to draft standard form terms that favor the drafting parties).
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sionals.41 It also would be cheaper for the drafting party to utilize the
same contract so that it does not have to negotiate and draft a new
contract from scratch with respect to similar transactions.42
For the party that does not prepare the contract, her interests
with respect to the contract are almost diametrically opposed to those
of the drafting party. The principal (the party that does not prepare
the contract) would be interested in less flexibility for the agent,
greater exposure to potential liability for the agent, more flexibility
for the principal, and less exposure to potential liability for the principal. If the principal (the non-drafting party) is not a repeat player,
the principal also may prefer a contract that is specifically tailored to
the principal’s personal situation rather than a written contract that
purports to govern the typical transaction.43
More significantly, the party that did not prepare the contract
may prefer not to have any written contract, particularly if the party
believes that she would be better protected in the absence of a written contract. For example, an individual consumer may prefer to purchase an apple without a contract, believing that food safety regulations, sales statutes, criminal statutes, or civil tort remedies will adequately protect her interests if the apple proves to be unsafe. The
41. Using the same contract may alleviate uncertainty for both courts and other contracting parties regarding particular terms. See Clayton P. Gillette, Standard Form Contracts, in 6 CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 115-16 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011)
(“[S]tandardization of contracts confers learning effects as courts and parties agree on
meanings of potentially vague terms. . . . Repeat players may prefer standard forms that
reduce uncertainty about the meaning of contract terms.”). For individual sellers, it makes
sense to incur the expense of drafting a one-sided contract if the contract will be used with
many costumers, even if the individual value of any one contract is minimal. See Meyerson,
supra note 1, at 599 (“The aggregate value to the business of the potential profit from each
individual transaction justifies the expense [of paying for legal advice regarding the contract].”). This obviously is not as true for consumers engaged in a rare and perhaps relatively inexpensive transaction.
42. This also may “facilitate control of agency costs in mass market transactions.”
Gillette, supra note 41, at 116. The agency literature in this area typically is concerned
about the agency relationships within the firm preparing the contract itself. “If agents [of
the drafting party such as a salesperson] are authorized to negotiate terms, principals will
have to monitor agents to ensure that contract modifications do not adversely affect the
pricing models under the original contract.” Id. By preventing internal agents from legally
modifying the forms, firms are able to prevent their agents from performing suboptimally.
See Barnett, supra note 7, at 631 (“[H]ow does the firm constrain the ability of agents to
serve their own interests . . . ? Simple: we bind both agents and third parties to the (unwaivable) terms in a form contract.”). In a somewhat ironic manner, permitting firms to
prevent their agents from acting opportunistically allows firms to act opportunistically
relative to the non-drafting parties.
43. This point is debatable. Individuals may be comforted utilizing a standard contract because it indicates to them that they are acting in accordance with typical social
practice. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1996) (“[I]n terms of negotiation theory,
customers sign arbitration clauses because firms leverage two important sources of bargaining power: the authoritative legality of the printed form and what psychologists call
‘social proof.’ ”).
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presence of a written contract may signal to the individual consumer
that the drafting party desires to limit the individual consumer’s existing (default) legal rights.44
The party that did not prepare the contract may also be entering
into a transaction of convenience, meaning that the party’s interests
with respect to the contract are only to receive the benefit of the
transaction. The principal, then, may authorize or ratify the preparation of the contract in order to receive the benefits of the transaction
as quickly as possible without regard to the legal consequences of the
written document (perceiving them to be a “necessary evil” to receive
the benefit of the transaction).45 For example, a computer user may
enter into a software license with a “click” of a button on the computer (without negotiation) in order to receive the benefits of the transaction as soon as possible. If the risks associated with the transaction
are perceived by the other party to be minimal, then the interests of
the other party may lie elsewhere, such as consummating the transaction as quickly as possible.
C. The Drafting Party’s Discretion
Significantly, the agent (the drafting party) also can take actions
that benefit her at the expense of the principal. In this instance, the
drafting party is preparing the document that, if signed unmodified,
specifies and will govern both parties’ legal obligations. As the preparer of the contract, the drafting party will have the ability to control the exact language used in the contract, including how the language defines and describes the various promises. The preparer can
decide which promises and other legally binding terms should be included as part of the agreement and describe them as desired by the

44. This may be somewhat similar to the way in which consumers view product liability disclaimers. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1565 (1999) (noting consumer perceptions of product warnings as the “handiwork of overly cautious manufacturer
attorneys” that do not need to be read).
45. This effect arises from both the rarity of the transactions themselves as well as
the lack of contract utility as perceived by the consumer. See Warkentine, supra note 14, at
515 (noting that “[t]he adhering parties encounter such forms [standard form contracts] in
isolated transactions and are more interested in the commodity or service they are purchasing than the form they are being asked to sign”). Moreover, even if inclined to read the
contract, consumers are unwilling to engage in unproductive uses of their time, such as
where the contract is not written in an understandable manner. See Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard- Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 446 (2002) (“Reading and understanding boilerplate terms is difficult
and time consuming for consumers. Consumers recognize that they are unlikely to understand the lengthy and complicated legal jargon in the boilerplate. To make matters worse,
consumers commonly encounter standard forms when they are in a hurry.”) (footnote omitted).
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preparer. The drafting party also will be able to control the presentation features of the contract such as its organization, font size,
length, and formatting.
As an economic agent, the drafting party is incentivized to prepare
the contract in such a way as to maximize her interests. It is a little
unusual in terms of agency because we typically think about agents
“shirking” their responsibilities, while in this instance the agent will
be actively seeking to undermine her responsibilities completely.46
That is, the agent will prepare the contract, but the agent is incentivized
to do so as to maximize the agent’s future gains under the contract.47
In this context, it makes more sense to understand contract preparation as providing an opportunity for the drafting party to receive
private benefits. The agent (the drafting party) may be placed in a
position to act in her own best interest to the detriment of the other
party, in this instance by including particular terms or conditions
and otherwise preparing the contract in the agent’s favor as opposed
to the other party’s. One could easily imagine the number of onesided provisions that could be included, such as altering the basic
“deal” terms of the promises, varying the standard of performance,
limiting contractual remedies of the non-drafting party by narrowing
the definition of damages or limiting the time period for claims of
breach, or correspondingly enlarging the contractual remedies of the
drafting party.
The agent may also be inclined to prepare the contract to induce
the principal to enter into the transaction, even if the transaction (as
described and governed by the contract) is not as attractive as it appears. For example, drafting parties may frame the contractual terms
in order to exploit particular cognitive biases of the non-drafting parties.48 Similarly, drafting parties can deter detection of their actions
by increasing the transaction costs for the non-drafting party involved with reviewing and negotiating the agreement, including by
using legalistic language, drafting lengthy agreements, or delaying
46. See Wright et al., supra note 26, at 413 (discussing the typical economic exchange
with a third party, wherein a party’s agent (dealing with the third party) can act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principal’s best interests).
47. For example, drafting parties will attempt to insert additional economic bonuses
for the drafting parties or penalties to the other party under the contract that may not
have been negotiated or contemplated by both parties. See Korobkin, supra note 37, at
1206 (suggesting that drafting parties will be incentivized to prepare one-sided standard
form contracts).
48. For example, drafting parties will be incentivized to draft contracts that impair
the non-drafting parties’ ability to assess the price of a product or service. See BAR-GILL,
supra note 2, at 23 (“Sophisticated sellers facing imperfectly rational consumers will seek
to reduce the perceived total price of their products without reducing the actual total price
that consumers pay. When consumers are myopic or optimistic, this wedge between perceived and actual prices can be achieved by back-loading costs onto long-term price
dimensions.”).
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delivery of contractual terms.49 Such self-interested actions can diminish the value that might otherwise have been realized by having
one party prepare the contract.50
D. The Non-Drafting Party’s Ability to Monitor and Control
The differing interests of the parties and the ability of the agent to
act in her own interest with respect to preparing the contract may
only be problematic if the principal is unable to detect the agent’s
self-interested behavior. For example, if the non-drafting party is
able to read and understand the contract and its legal implications,
then the non-drafting party may be able to detect whether the drafting party did in fact prepare the written document in her favor. Nevertheless, in many instances, it may be difficult and expensive to
monitor or verify the behavior of the agent (the drafting party).51
For example, the contract may be written in legalistic language,
making it difficult for the principal to understand what the written
contract actually means.52 In addition, many parties entering into a
contract may be unaware of the legal implications of particular language (even if the terms are understandable).53 In certain instances,

49. The intentional use of such tactics, particularly where non-drafting consumers are
not in a position to counteract them, has been criticized. See Sovern, supra note 8, at 1660-61.
50. This diminishment in value is, again, something endemic to the principal-agent
problem and again suggests the relevance of such literature to the contract-drafting scenario. See BLACKMON, supra note 9, at 7 (“Thus the principal-agent relationship has two
sides: There are benefits to be reaped from the comparative advantage of the agent, yet
there are also losses to be incurred from unobserved, self-interested actions of the agent.”).
51. As discussed in Part II supra, monitoring may be difficult because of the information and expertise gap between the parties. In addition, monitoring may be expensive,
particularly if expense is measured relative to the value of the transaction to the nondrafting party. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (2006) (“The democratization of markets and the repeat
nature of the seller’s transactions give rise to the prospect of the incremental extra charge,
the marginal defect in goods, the sleight of hand of the bait-and-switch, all of which are not
worth the transactional headaches for the consumer to challenge.”).
52. This is particularly true when the non-drafting party is not an attorney or likely
to be represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 78 (2013) (“[S]ince standard form contracts are usually drafted by
lawyers, the language is often inaccessible to laypeople.”); BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 29
(arguing that learning from expert advice for particular transactions has its limits because,
inter alia, “consumers do not seek advice before each and every purchase or use decision”
and such advice may not be available in each situation).
53. See Meyerson, supra note 1, at 596 (“While information can never be perfect, it is
particularly inappropriate to make an assumption of perfect consumer knowledge. Even
though consumers may know many of the characteristics of frequently purchased products,
they will remain ignorant of the characteristics of contract terms which typical experience
does not reveal.”).
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the non-drafting party may also not have the time (or be inclined to
spend the time) to read a lengthy contract to determine and consider
the legal implications of each provision.54
Similarly, the differing interests of the parties and the agent’s discretion may be more problematic if the principal is not situated to be
able to counteract or address the agent’s behavior.55 For example,
even if one was able and had the time to read the contract and thereby encounter contractual provisions that might be problematic, that
individual still may be unable to figure out how to modify the words
used in the contract.56 A non-drafting party may also be unable to
control the drafting party’s behavior where the contract is offered on
a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis or under similar circumstances that make
modification of the contract difficult.57 For example, consumers often
interact with corporate employees that do not, or do not appear to,
have the authority to modify the consumer contract.58 It also may be
difficult or expensive to “shop” for better contractual terms in
such situations.59

54. The difficulty in comprehending the language is compounded when the value of
the transaction is low. As suggested by Eisenberg, “[w]here form contracts involve a low
dollar value of performance, the cost of thorough search and deliberation on preprinted
terms, let alone the cost of legal advice about the meaning and effect of the terms, will usually be prohibitive in relation to the benefits.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 (1995).
55. Accordingly, “[e]ven if the principal can tell what the agent did, he may be unable
to tell what the agent should have done to serve the principal’s interests.” BLACKMON, supra note 9, at 7. In terms of contract drafting, the inability of the non-drafting party to
understand and counteract one-sided drafts undercuts the meaningfulness of assent to
such contracts. Bar-Gill argues that this is because “[t]he freedom of contract paradigm is
based on the presumption that contracting parties correctly anticipate their future actions
and thus the future consequences of the contract they have signed.” Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1415 (2004).
56. Moreover, it may not be cost-effective for the non-drafting party to solicit expert
advice. See Meyerson, supra note 1, at 598-99 (“A consumer will only purchase the services
of an attorney if the expected loss from not understanding the contract exceeds the cost of
legal advice. For most consumer purchases other than a house, the cost of legal advice will
far exceed the expected value of the gain to be derived.”).
57. This is the case for many contracts of adhesion. See Robert Prentice, ContractBased Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
337, 361-62 (2003) (“Consumers and investors not only think that adhesion contracts are
generally nonnegotiable, they are correct (practically speaking) in so thinking.”) (footnote
omitted).
58. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1225 (1983) (“Customers know well enough that they cannot alter any individual firm’s standard document. . . . If they do not [understand the take-it-or-leave it nature of the agreement], and if they attempt to bargain the form terms, the salesman will
explain his lack of authority to vary the form.”).
59. In some instances, a different seller offering better terms might be difficult to
locate. See Meyerson, supra note 1, at 599 (“Whatever benefit might be derived by the consumer who accurately understands a contract term must be further discounted by the high
transaction costs of altering the term or finding a seller with a preferred term.”).
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As discussed in Part II, individuals may not be able to assess risks
accurately, which will diminish their inclination, and therefore their
ability, to monitor and control the agent’s actions.60 For example, if
one does not perceive accurately the risk of the drafting party preparing a one-sided contract, then the non-drafting party may not be in a
position to address the principal-agent problem.61 Similarly, even if
the other party perceives accurately the risk that the drafting party
will prepare a one-sided contract, the other party may not accurately
perceive the risks associated with such a one-sided contract.62 Put
another way, the non-drafting party may believe that it is unlikely
that she will be forced to incur any liability arising from a one-sided
contract, even if the non-drafting party has actually read the contract
and is aware of possible negative outcomes. For example, a credit
card holder may comprehend that a credit card agreement is likely to
be one-sided in favor of the credit card issuer and may even be aware
that contingent fees may be assessed, but the credit card holder
also might underestimate the likelihood of such contingencies
actually occurring.63

60. See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 1373 (“The [consumer] contract itself, commonly
designed by the seller, will be shaped around consumers’ systematic deviations from perfect rationality.”); Bern, supra note 7, at 721-22 (“The combined effect of [bounded rationality and cognitive defects] is to produce a setting in which consumers are very vulnerable to
being overreached by sellers and sellers are tempted to act opportunistically.”).
61. For example, on a basic level, the mere fact that consumers do not read or understand certain types of contracts can lead to strategic contract drafting by sellers. See Meyerson, supra note 1, at 595 (“[I]nefficient transactions occur because consumers do not read
form contracts, or do not understand the terms, and are thus unaware of their contents.
Moreover, the businesses that draft these contracts do so knowing that they will not be
read by the typical consumer.”) (footnote omitted). Moreover, even when reading contracts,
consumers may be inclined to underestimate the risk that the contract is one-sided. See
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 451 (“[S]everal features of the business-toconsumer standard-form contract suggest that consumers are more apt to worry too little
about contractual risks.”); Warkentine, supra note 14, at 515 (noting that consumers “may
shop for the price of the goods or the color of the car, but they will almost never think about
the form contract they are required to sign”).
62. Some non-drafting parties may be overly optimistic about risks of negative contractual outcomes, even though such parties understand the risks as created by the contract. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1179 (2003) (“[I]f individuals are overconfident about their own ability to perform the terms of the contract, they would tend to underestimate the likelihood that they
will be unable to perform. They might then be too willing to enter into clauses that expand
their own liability for nonperformance.”) (footnote omitted). This is particularly true with
respect to risky terms that do not concern performance and do not have a high degree of
risk. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 241 (noting how “bounded rationality, optimistic
disposition, systematic underestimation of risks, and undue weight on the present as compared with the future” are relevant to particular types of contractual provisions).
63. BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 53-54 (noting that consumers underestimate the likelihood that the contingency of a future cost will materialize—for example, an optimistic credit cardholder might underestimate the probability of making a late payment, leading her to
underestimate the importance of the late fee).
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E. Agency Costs and Contract Preparation
In the contract preparation context, the non-drafting party may
take steps to address the principal-agent problem. In other words, in
order to ensure that the agent does not use her superior information
and control to perform (or fail to perform) the agreed-upon task of
preparing the contract as desired, the principal may incur monitoring
and other agency costs.
First, the non-drafting party could reduce the information asymmetry by monitoring the preparation of the contract by reading it and
negotiating it. Reading, though, can be costly in terms of time.64 The
non-preparer also could reduce the information and control gap by
hiring other parties to act on her behalf.65 In the contract preparation
context, one may hire an attorney to make sure that the contract is
prepared in accordance with expectations, which often can be costly.66
As a preliminary matter, a party could engage in transactions only
with those parties that have good reputations with respect to their
contracts by screening potential applicants or hiring an outside party
to screen them.67
Outside parties also could act on the principal’s behalf without the
principal’s consent or knowledge.68 For example, statutes may protect
non-drafting parties by prohibiting particular provisions or requiring
particular contract presentation or disclosure. Similarly, judges can
determine ex post whether a drafting party took unfair advantage of

64. This cost is often compounded where the parties have a relationship or have already discussed particular deal elements. See Korobkin, supra note 52, at 77 (“[A]t least
when the drafting party has already described salient elements of a proposed deal, reading
is not a low-cost way to avoid the risk of opportunist exploitation of nondrafting parties.”).
65. See Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1168 (“Individuals often learn to restructure
problems so as to avoid, or at least reduce, the difficulties that the limitations of human
cognition would otherwise impose. . . . Furthermore, individuals can delegate decisionmaking to privately employed experts with better judgment.”).
66. The cost should be measured based on the relative value of the transaction.
Korobkin, supra note 52, at 78 (“When this is the case [that laypersons cannot understand
a standard form contract’s terms], the task of ‘reading’ the standard form contract actually
requires paying a lawyer to review it, a process that is costly even if the contract itself is
not long.”). In addition, engaging another party (an economic agent) gives rise to a separate
principal-agent problem. The non-drafting party will now be forced to assess whether the
expert is effectively performing and may be unable to do so, and the expert may be inclined
not to perform as effectively as might be desired by the non-drafting party (based on the
asymmetry of information and control). See Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1219
(“[E]mploying expert decisionmakers is costly. Experts can charge dearly for their time,
and as with organizational settings, agency problems emerge.”).
67. See Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1216 (“As an alternative to organizational choice,
people can delegate their decisions to others. Many professionals offer more than just
knowledge—they offer a better decisionmaking perspective.”).
68. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 689 (suggesting that other parties, such as courts or
regulators, could act on behalf of buyers with respect to particular contracts).
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the non-drafting party with respect to the preparation of the contract. As with any other monitoring techniques, however, there is an
associated cost.69
III. CONTRACT LAW REFORMS: WHAT DOES ECONOMIC AGENCY
TELL US?
A.

Identifying Problematic Contracts

Understanding the contract preparation process as being based on
an agency relationship enhances our understanding of various contract formation problems. The principal-agent problem initially helps
us identify which types of contracts may be problematic. Issues with
respect to contract formation arise when the principal (the nondrafting party) does not have sufficient control or information regarding the agent’s (the drafting party) actions with respect to the preparation of the contract.
The existing critiques of problematic legal consent to contract,
then, can be understood as attacking the issues that stem from the
economic agency relationship between the parties concerning the
form and content of the written contract. Without the ability to observe and control the agent preparing the contract, the principal that
signs the contract may have little ability to control the contents of
the contract.
In the standard view of a negotiated or “dickered” contract, each
party will read and negotiate the terms of the contract. It may seem a
little inaccurate, then, to describe one of the parties as being an
“agent” in this situation. After all, each party is “active” with respect
to the final appearance of the contract, whether by negotiating the
contract or making actual modifications to the initial draft. This activity, though, proves the point of the economic agency analysis outlined in this Article. Each party “needed” to be active or else face the
risks associated with the principal-agent problems involved if only
one party prepares the contract.
The fact that a contract may have been “dickered” suggests that
the principal (the non-drafting party) was in a position to detect and
counteract any negative results from the agent’s opportunistic behavior such as any unfavorable contractual provisions. If the principal
can respond to the agent’s completion of the written contract by reviewing the contract, identifying problematic provisions, and negotiating

69. Gillette discusses the agency costs that arise when courts or regulators attempt to
represent customers, which can significantly affect the effectiveness of such agents. Id.
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alternatives, then the principal will have incurred the necessary
agency costs to avoid any unfortunate results arising from the opportunistic behavior of the agent (the drafting party).
A “dickered” contract may also suggest that the principal was in a
position to, or did in fact, screen potential agents. If the principal had
leverage enough to negotiate contractual provisions, then presumably
the principal also could have considered other potential contractual
partners or screened the opposing party. If the principal did not believe that she had the leverage to negotiate such terms, then such
negotiation may not have taken place.
Such active or sophisticated parties also may have incurred other
agency costs to address the principal-agent problem in contract preparation. The principal (the party not preparing the contract) may
have hired an attorney or other advisor to assist with the negotiation
and revision of the contract.70 The attorney will provide the principal
with information regarding the task performed by the drafting party
(as agent). For example, an attorney will be able to explain what various terms within the contract mean as well as advise, if the attorney
is experienced, as to whether the contract contains any unusual or
off-market terms. This “monitoring” is an additional cost to the principal, but it is incurred based on the principal’s awareness that the
agent (the drafting party) otherwise will be able to prepare a onesided contract.
In addition, an attorney will permit the principal to counteract
any acts taken by the drafting party to prepare a one-sided contract.
First, the attorney may be able to negotiate better terms on the principal’s behalf. The attorney may also be utilized to revise the initial
contract and use her expertise (that the non-drafting party does not
possess) to do so. As an agent, of course, the attorney perhaps also
faces the same conflict of interest as the opposing contracting party
when preparing the contract. The attorney, for example, may desire
to utilize a lower level of care when preparing the contract than otherwise might be desired by the principal (if the attorney is being
compensated based upon completion of the task as opposed to an
hourly basis). In this instance, however, the agent of contract preparation (the attorney) is not involved with as severe a principal-agent
problem as the initial agent of contract preparation (the opposing
contracting party). The attorney is not only bound by ethical rules
concerning attorney conduct, but the attorney also faces malpractice
lawsuits if the contract is not prepared in the principal’s best inter70. Presumably, the non-drafting party would need to perceive accurately that a contract might be one-sided and recognize that she is unable to address the associated problems with such a contract. See Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1219 (“Often, even if people
employ a suboptimal strategy and cannot adapt, they can recognize their own limitations
and hire others to help them make decisions.”).
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ests. More directly, the attorney does not directly benefit from a contract that is not prepared in the principal’s best interests, while the
opposing contracting party does. Thus, the attorney likely will be a
better agent (than the drafting party) for the principal with respect
to preparing the contract.71
The economic analysis of the agency relationship surrounding contract preparation thus can help inform legal analysis of the consent
to the written contract. Whether a contract is negotiated can be an
important indication of whether the principal-agent problem has
manifested itself unchecked. If unchecked, legal consent to the written contract may be more highly questionable. Where sophisticated
principals have incurred (or are able to incur) agency costs and have
attempted to (or are able to) monitor the preparation of the contract,
the agents’ opportunistic behavior may be constrained.72 On the other
hand, where these agency costs are not or cannot be incurred regularly, there perhaps is more concern that the agent will be able to utilize
her superior information and control to prepare a one-sided contract.
Of course, existing contract law scholarship has recognized these
issues without resort to economic theory. As will be seen, however,

71. Rachlinski suggests that attorneys are well situated to help a client overcome
certain cognitive biases. He cites how financial planners help alleviate overconfidence problems when clients select their own investments and suggests that “[a]ttorneys also can
restructure problems for their clients in ways that avoid common cognitive pitfalls.” Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1216. Being “situated somewhat outside of the decision making
environment, [attorneys] can see multiple frames and other perspectives more easily than
clients.” Id. at 1216-17.
72. Issacharoff & Delaney argue:
Focusing on ex post mechanisms—such as knowledge gained through repeat
play or the availability of agents to counteract imperfect spot judgments—
highlights a shortcoming in the behavioral literature. . . . “Over time, individuals will seek out others who have better knowledge than themselves to make
critical decisions, at least as long as they have some recourse against fraud and
other forms of misappropriation.”
Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 51, at 168 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order
Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355, 365 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006)). This may be true, but some empirical data has suggested that standard
form contracts used in the automotive industry “consistently contained one-sided language
that favored the drafter and extracted value from counterparties, notwithstanding the
relational nature of the contracts and the sophisticated nature of the adhering party.” Gillette, supra note 41, at 121. Perhaps even the sophisticated contracting party can fall victim to the other party’s opportunistic contract preparation.
See, e.g.,
Andrew Trotman, Man Who Created Own Credit Card Sues Bank for Not
Sticking to Terms, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/personalfinance/borrowing/creditcards/10231556/Man-who-created-own-credit-cardsues-bank-for-not-sticking-to-terms.html (describing how a credit card consumer altered
the terms of a standard form agreement in his favor, which agreement was then signed by
the bank as revised without detection).
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economic theory helps illuminate the failure of current contract law
doctrine to address problematic contract formation issues and suggests other solutions.
Typically, the “consent” issue in contract law is discussed in terms
of whether a party to a contract assented to a contract in a legally
sufficient manner, including by making a promise.73 For example,
many have noted the tendency of individuals to assent to standard
form contracts without reading, negotiating, or understanding the
contract.74 Although these signatures certainly manifest an objective
intent to be bound, scholars have been troubled (albeit to different
degrees) by the lack of “meaningful” consent to such contracts.75
73. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a contract as “a promise . . . for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy” and a promise as “a manifestation of intention to
act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promissee in understanding that a commitment has been made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1,
2 (1981). Braucher identified consent as a social construction. See Jean Braucher, Contract
Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
697, 704 (1990). As contract delivery techniques have evolved, the debate about the proper
construction of consent has followed. Accordingly, Gillette concluded:
Much of the contracts literature from the past three decades has been devoted
to the identification of default rules that apply in the face of contractual silence
and of decision rules that resolve conflict when one party attempts to bind the
other party to terms on which no negotiation occurred.
Gillette, supra note 6, at 679.
74. Rakoff, supra note 58, at 1179 (noting that “the few empirical studies that have
been done have agreed” that consumers are unlikely to read boilerplate or standard terms).
This practice extends to electronic contracts as well. See Gillette, supra note 41, at 118
(“The high costs related to reading suggest that few consumers will actually read standard
contract terms, an assumption confirmed by surveys concerning online contracts.”) (citation
omitted). There are various reasons or justifications given for the low reading rate of consumer standard form contracts, including the relative expense of determining the meaning
of particular terms, the take-or-leave-it basis of many consumer transactions, and the cognitive biases of consumers. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 243 (“[A] rational form taker
will typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms.”); Hillman & Rachlinski,
supra note 45, at 450 (“[C]onsumers also rely on decisionmaking strategies about contractual risks that keep them from reading the boilerplate.”); Meyerson, supra note 1, at 59798 (“Subordinate [contract] terms will not be known because the cost of acquiring the necessary information exceeds the expected gain to the consumer from that information.”);
Warkentine, supra note 14, at 469-70 (“People who sign standard form contracts rarely
read them. . . . The party who has the greater bargaining power usually writes the standard form contract and often presents it for signature on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.”).
75. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
370 (1960) (asserting that “specific” consent is not given to boilerplate or subordinate contractual clauses); RADIN, supra note 32, at 31 (“[T]o conclude our initial exploration of the
normative degradation caused by boilerplate: Recipients cannot be said to have consented
to, and thereby become subject to, purported contracts when they don’t know that they
exist . . . .”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 860-61 (2006) (“[J]udges and legal scholars viewed marketdriven uniformity in standard-form contract terms with alarm, perceiving that even in
reasonably competitive markets, consumers often had no choice of contract terms, so that a
consumer’s apparent contractual assent to such terms was really ‘but a subjection more or
less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party . . . .’ ” (quoting Friedrick Kessler,
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Without reading, negotiating, or understanding these contracts,
scholars are troubled that parties are relinquishing, or at least are
being understood by judges as relinquishing, significant legal rights.76
As with all contracts but even more so with standard form contracts, the drafting party may be able to take actions that further her
interests at the expense of the principal’s interests. If one knows others do not read, then it is possible to prepare contracts that include
terms that would not otherwise be agreed to or accepted.77 Similarly,
Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
632 (1943))); Warkentine, supra note 14, at 479 (“Indeed, there appears to be a general
consensus among scholars that a court should not treat the mere act of signing a standard
form contract as assent to all of the individual terms of the contract.”). But see Barnett,
supra note 7, at 636 (“[W]hen consenting in this manner [by clicking ‘I agree’ to an unread
license agreement on a web site] one is running the risk of binding oneself to a promise one
may regret later when learning its content. But the law does not, and should not, bar all
assumptions of risk.”); Gillette, supra note 41, at 119 (explaining that “the absence of explicit assent to standard contracts may be less problematic than neoclassical contract theory implies, because the drafter does not intend to deploy nominally oppressive terms in the
absence of circumstances that would warrant their use to constrain opportunistic buyers”).
For thoughtful discussions of the varying scholarly approaches to the problem of consent to
standard form contracts, see generally Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract
Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269
(1993); Warkentine, supra note 14. This Article also addresses the failure of particular
reforms designed to address standard form contracts based on understandings from economic agency infra Part III.B.
76. An initial argument against such contracts is that they are used to exploit the
weaknesses of non-drafting parties to force them into undesired or unfavorable transactions. See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 51, at 166 (“[T]he democratization of markets
and their transformation into mass markets strains this simple contractarian story [that
market pressures will induce agents to act more in accordance with the interests of principals]. Increasingly, the relations between large sellers and multiple small buyers becomes
a world of contracts of adhesion, with terms and conditions set by the seller with no realistic prospect of negotiation.”); Meyerson, supra note 1, at 594 (“One complaint frequently
raised about standard form contracts, however, is that, because these contracts are not
subject to negotiation, consumers generally will be worse off because of their use.”). The
linchpin of this argument is the empirical reality that standard form contracts are not
read, which permits drafting parties to compete to exploit the non-drafting parties. See
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 454 (“This failure [by consumers to read standard
terms] undermines market pressure to provide mutually beneficial terms. Despite their
institutional limitations, courts therefore have reason to police the terms of standard-form
contracts to protect consumers from exploitation.”). Such exploitation can include the modification or removal of default legal rights to which the non-drafting party is otherwise entitled, which suggests that the non-drafting party may need additional protection. See KIM,
supra note 6, at 51 (noting how new forms of standard form contracts, such as clickwrap
and browsewrap, permitted companies to “extract from consumers additional benefits that
were unrelated to the transaction”); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of
Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 201-02 (2010) (“The terms included in SFCs [standard form
contracts] may at times seek to alter the legal rights that are usually granted to the consumer. Accordingly, academics call on courts and legislatures to intervene and provide
consumers with adequate protection and relief.”) (footnote omitted).
77. Since standard form contracts are not read, it should be easy for drafting parties
to prepare more one-sided contracts. See Gillette, supra note 41, at 118 (noting that,
“[a]lthough [the] failure to read may be rational, sellers could exploit buyer inattention to
insert terms without risk that buyers will object”). Given the repeat nature of many trans-
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if drafting parties could exploit the known decision-making tendencies or other cognitive limitations of non-drafting parties,78 drafting
parties would “naturally” be inclined to do so.79 For example, drafting
parties often include the unilateral power to modify their consumer
contracts.80 In such instances, the drafting parties (as parties to the
contract) are likely to modify the contract in such a manner to serve
only the preparers’ interests, and the non-drafting party may have
assented to the contract without reading the term or appreciating
its significance.81
More problematically, not only may these contracts be heavily
slanted in favor of the drafting party, but the drafting party may also
actions for certain drafting parties, such drafting parties are also uniquely situated to be
able to identify how and where one-sided terms would be most effective. See
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 440 (“The ability of businesses to identify efficient
allocation of risks also gives them the opportunity to exploit consumers by getting them to
accept contract terms that inefficiently shift risks to consumers.”). As an empirical matter,
it is understood that standard form contracts generally favor the drafting party. See Prentice, supra note 57, at 385 (“Provisions that make up the boilerplate of the form contracts
will be almost universally pro-seller and anticonsumer/investor and, of course, seldom advertised.”); Warkentine, supra note 14, at 516 (“[I]t is common for terms in standard form
contracts to favor the drafter.”).
78. See BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 10 (“Sellers benefit from the divergence between
perceived and actual benefits and between perceived and actual prices. They will design
their contracts and prices to maximize this divergence.”).
79. In part, this is based on the relative interests and situations of the parties. See
Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 243 (concluding that the “asymmetrical incentives [based on
the repeat nature of many transactions for the preparers of form contracts] almost always
work to heavily slant form contracts in favor of form givers”). In other words, the relative
inequalities in knowledge provide an opportunity for one party to extract benefits from the
other. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 440 (“[B]usinesses have incentives and
opportunities both to allocate the risks of the contract efficiently and to impose hidden
risks on consumers where possible.”); Meyerson, supra note 1, at 605 (“Because consumers
lack the knowledge to evaluate the cost of [a] risk, a rational seller will draft contract
terms that shift risks to the consumer.”). The motivation to do so generally is understood to
be a factor in the drafting party’s attorneys’ behavior as well. See Prentice, supra note 57,
at 386 (“Farnsworth . . . has noted that in his own experience in legal practice, ‘no one in
any of the corporations or in the law firm ever suggested that the forms should be drafted
other than as one-sidedly in the interests of the corporate client as possible.’ ” (quoting E.
Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract
Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 44 (1984))). Beyond the underlying incentives to exploit such
situations, Bar-Gill also suggests that drafting parties must exploit non-drafting parties’
weaknesses or lose ground to competitors (who will). See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 1373
(“Such biased contracting is not the consequence of imperfect competition. On the contrary,
competitive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumers’ weaknesses.”).
80. Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (noting the increased public scrutiny for sellers’ ability to modify contracts unilaterally).
81. Bar-Gill and Davis note that “there is no guarantee that the modifications will be
mutually beneficial; sellers are likely to propose unilateral modifications that serve their
own interests, but not necessarily those of consumers.” Id. at 6. This is based on drafting
parties’ knowledge of how non-drafting parties interact with such contracts. See Meyerson,
supra note 75, at 1290-91 (“Since the drafters are aware that consumers do not read their
contracts, the drafters know that the contract will not inform consumers of their legal
rights.”).
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be able to prepare the contract in a manner designed to induce quick
assent.82 In particular, contracts could be designed to exploit the various decision-making biases of the general consumer.83 By using
lengthy contracts, for example, a drafting party may be able to overwhelm the non-drafting party’s ability to detect unfavorable contractual terms.84 The appearance of contracts combined with particular
cognitive biases of the non-drafting parties may strongly deter the
non-drafting party from resisting the contract’s terms.85 Indeed, con-

82. Drafting parties can deter non-drafting parties from even attempting to read or
negotiate a contract by increasing the costs of doing so through particular contract design.
See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 479 (“Just as businesses utilize fine print and
hidden terms in the paper world to increase the costs of finding and reading terms, certain
methods of presentation of the terms and conditions can also discourage e-consumers from
reading the boilerplate.”). Time and other constraints can also be utilized to discourage
reading or negotiating contracts. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 313 (2008) (noting that “in many instances consumers
enter SFCs [standard form contracts] under unfavorable circumstances . . . frequently
characterized by noise, time constraints and vendors’ attempts to manipulate consumers”).
Consequently, non-drafting parties may be effectively deterred. David Horton, Flipping the
Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 435
(2009) (“[B]ecause standard-form contracts are non-negotiable and consist of a maze of
inscrutable fine print, a reasonable consumer would probably not spend time trying to
decipher their terms.”).
83. For example, contract decisions may not be made based on all of the relevant facts
or factors. See Korobkin, supra note 52, at 80 (“Cognitive limitations on human beings’
abilities to process information often cause individuals making contracting decisions to
narrow their focus to a relatively small number of ‘salient’ decision attributes and ignore
the [rest] . . . .”).
84. If there is too much material within the contract, the non-drafting party may
choose to ignore most of the terms. See Sovern, supra note 8, at 1678-79 (“Too much information appears to cause many consumers to adopt strategies to reduce the amount of information to a more manageable amount when making decisions. Consequently, many
consumers undoubtedly ‘manage away’ the small print.”) (footnote omitted). Similarly,
drafting parties can manipulate and format the contract language to make it more difficult
to locate or understand important terms. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 45, at 446
(“Businesses also can create boilerplate that is difficult to read by using small print, a light
font, and all-capital lettering and by burying important terms in the middle of the form.”);
Meyerson, supra note 1, at 598 (“The cost to the consumer is made all the more excessive
by the high cost of understanding a term’s legal significance. Again, some sellers try to
increase this cost by hiding the term’s meaning in obscure ‘legalese.’ ”) (footnote omitted).
85. Once given to the non-drafting party, the written contract may come to represent
the status quo that is unlikely to be challenged. Prentice, supra note 57, at 372 (“When
form givers hand form contracts to form takers, the form takers are likely to view the contracts as embodying the status quo and will for this reason, among others, be reluctant to
attempt to alter them.”). Along the same lines, “densely typed provisions” can induce deference “to the contract’s printed authority.” Shell, supra note 43, at 1369. Given the persistence of the status quo bias in contract negotiations, Korobkin hypothesizes that “contracting parties can gain a powerful advantage in negotiations by providing a set of draft terms
as the basis for detailed negotiations with their contracting partners.” Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules
and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1627 (1998).
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trol of the initial document likely is in and of itself a significant advantage to the drafting party.86
More fundamentally, arguments about meaningful consent to such
contractual terms may in fact arise from the principal-agent problem
that exists with respect to the task of preparing the contract. When
the misalignment of interests, information, and control between the
agent (the drafting party) and the principal (the non-drafting party)
makes legal observers uncomfortable, it may signal a level of discomfort with assigning reflexive legal validity based upon objective consent to the contract.87 To be clear, though, this misalignment exists to
some extent each time a contract is prepared. Scholars, however, typically only suggest reforms in those instances where the principal
cannot monitor or remediate the agent’s opportunistic behavior
(drafting a one-sided contract). If the other party to a contract cannot
meaningfully monitor the agent’s activities, then perhaps the principal’s empowerment (or ratification) of the drafting party’s preparation of the contract (by executing the contract) should be given less
legal significance or at least invite more judicial or legislative scrutiny.
The behavioral economics critique of consumer contracts also can
be understood in this manner. Traditional economic theory would
describe the monitoring issues that arise in the consumer context as
a problem of an information asymmetry.88 If the buyer does not have
enough information because of the method of disclosure or similar
issues, then the seller will be able to exploit this asymmetry to her
advantage. Behavioral economics, on the other hand, focuses on sys86. See Korobkin, supra note 85 (“The inertia theory suggests that . . . it might be
possible for a party to convince an opposing negotiator that her uniquely preferred set of
contract terms will be enacted through ‘inaction’ rather than action, even if those terms are
uncommon in the industry in question and contrary to legal defaults.”). Of course, control
of the document may be a function of bargaining power as opposed to a negotiated outcome.
See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2011) (“Because contracts are made binding . . . the party that gets to dictate or
impose terms during contract formation will usually get to keep and use those terms in the
event of any subsequent contract dispute. Clearly, the party that has the ability to impose
terms during contract formation is the party with the bargaining power to do so.”) (footnote
omitted).
87. If, for example, we do not believe that consumers can act in their own best interests when facing such contracts, then perhaps others should act in their stead. See, e.g.,
Rachlinski, supra note 62, at 1182 (“These cognitive problems that people arguably encounter when they think about how and whether to enter into contracts undermine the
basis for freedom of contract. . . . Regulatory or judicial intervention in contracts could thus
save people from themselves.”).
88. See, e.g., Hülsmann, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that conventional theory “explains moral hazard as a consequence of the fact that market participants are unequally
well informed about economic reality”). Certain judicial doctrines, such as unconscionability, arguably arose based on such a classical understanding of the agency problem. See
Meyerson, supra note 1, at 613 (“The classic case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. can be understood as judicial condemnation of the disparity of information between
buyer and seller.”) (footnote omitted).
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tematic limitations on the ability of the buyer to detect or prevent
opportunistic behavior (as opposed to the information asymmetry itself).89 If buyers are unable, because of cognitive limitations, to act
(completely) rationally, then sellers will be able to exploit these limitations in their contracts.90
B.

The Failure of Traditional Reforms

The economic analysis outlined above allows us to better understand and critique contract law reforms as they address the fundamental agency issue of contract preparation. Existing contractual
reforms are, explicitly or implicitly, based on improving the ability of
the principal to monitor the agent, or empowering others to monitor
the agent, to determine whether the agent has performed properly or
legally. These reforms focus on the principal’s ability to control and
not the agent’s underlying incentives to perform at a lower level and
to conceal deficiencies. Each of these reforms in some sense is an
agency cost that a party incurs, regardless of whether the cost is
incurred voluntarily.
As an example, reforms often attempt to address the consent problem in standard form contracts, discussed in Part III.A., by attempting to provide the principals (the non-drafting parties) with additional information. These reforms presumably would permit the principals to monitor more effectively the contract’s preparation.91 For example, many statutes now require particular contracts to contain
particular sets of disclosures and particular styles or formats of disclosures.92 Under the reforms introduced by the Credit Card Ac-

89. As Bar-Gill explains, “[t]he behavioral-economics theory of contract design is an
imperfect-rationality theory, not an imperfect-information theory.” BAR-GILL, supra note 2,
at 21; see also Petersen, supra note 2, at 289 (suggesting that the “agency framework [in
the mathematical literature] would be strengthened by taking the notion of bounded rationality seriously”).
90. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 7-8 (“The behavioral-economics theory rests on
two tenets: (1) Consumers’ purchasing and use decisions are affected by systematic misperceptions (2) Sellers design their products, contracts, and prices in response to these misperceptions.”); Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 51, at 162 (“Behavioral literature suggests
that companies should be expected to design contractual offers in anticipation of the predictable decisional heuristics of consumers, such as overconfidence.”).
91. Once informed, the non-drafting party supposedly will be in a better position to
determine whether the drafting party drafted a one-sided contract and act accordingly. See
Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 549-50 (2014) (“Legislatures and regulators commonly respond to the noreading problem by requiring ever-widening sets of disclosures and initialing procedures
that are meant to induce consumers to become informed about particular terms before
becoming bound.”).
92. These procedural “protections are intended to improve the process by which the
terms become part of the contract by attempting to increase the chance that the consumer
has in fact read and consented to the provisions.” Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for In-
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countability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, credit card issuers
must disclose certain terms “clearly and conspicuously.”93 Similarly,
under the Uniform Commercial Code, certain waivers of contractual
rights or warranties must also be disclosed in a particular manner.94
Each of these reforms seems designed, at least in part, to address
the inability of the party that did not prepare the contract to detect
such important contractual provisions.95 In economic agency terms,
this means that the reforms are designed to empower the principal to
monitor the drafting party’s actions rather than empowering another
to act on the principal’s behalf.96 If the party is unable to do so on her
own, then the reform may require the agent (the drafting party) to
assist the party through disclosure to detect the drafting party’s inclination to draft one-sided (important) provisions.
The ability of these reforms to assist such principals is highly
questionable, however.97 From an economic agency perspective, it appears that certain principals are unwilling or unable to utilize or
comprehend such additional information to avoid one-sided contracts.98 Passive disclosure, regardless of the improved substance,
format, or font, with respect to the information contained in lengthy

ternet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1883, 1920 (2005).
93. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, § 103, 123 Stat. 1734, 1741 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1637).
94. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2012) (requiring any exclusion or modification to the
implied warranty of merchantability to be “by a writing and conspicuous”).
95. Legislation can provide some protection (to be enforced by courts) “by enhancing
the likelihood that the consumer is at least aware of a provision before signing the standard form.” O’Hara, supra note 92, at 1921.
96. Hart explains “disclosure statutes protect the parties’ freedom of contract–the
classical autonomy value–by continuing to allow the parties to contract for essentially
whatever they want.” Hart, supra note 86, at 26 (footnote omitted).
97. Bar-Gill and Davis “are skeptical, however, about the efficacy of disclosure mandates” (with respect to unilateral modifications of contracts). “We are not confident that
consumers would be able to use this information to avoid sellers who either propose welfare-reducing initial contracts or who are likely to propose welfare-reducing modifications.”
Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 80, at 28-29. Ayres and Schwartz have suggested that the
premise that mandating more conspicuous disclosure will assist or encourage non-drafting
parties to read “founders on the avalanche of real-world evidence that virtually no one
wants to read contract terms regardless of how accessibly rendered those terms are.”
Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 91, at 550. On the other hand, Bar-Gill has recognized, at
least with respect to certain consumer transactions, that “disclosure has been effective to
at least some extent.” BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 33.
98. As Hart notes:
To be a rational actor therefore presupposes that one will not only have access
to the information relevant to one’s decision but will also be able to understand
it and make effective use of it. Unfortunately, none of this is true in general
and not when it comes, more particularly, to contracts.
Hart, supra note 86, at 48 (footnote omitted).
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standard form contracts may not improve the ability of non-drafting
parties (principals) to comprehend and change one-sided contracts.99
The use of legislative requirements with respect to the disclosure
and format of disclosure of material contractual terms is also generally problematic. Such requirements represent the legislature’s understanding of what information is salient and understandable by the
non-drafting party. That the legislature does a good job of determining how and what disclosures to mandate is arguable at best.100 Such
mandates also require adjudicators to determine whether a particular disclosure standard, such as “clear and conspicuous,” has been
met. Adjudicators may not be well-positioned to determine what a
clear and conspicuous disclosure is, particularly if the standard is
understood as requiring disclosure that would actually be read by
many or most non-drafting parties. As with other determinations,
there is no empirical evidence that adjudicators perform well in this
area. For example, courts have often relied on the existence of a nondisclosing party’s act in response to disclosure to determine that disclosure was properly made. If a consumer “clicked” her assent to an
online license agreement, that is typically understood as signifying
proper disclosure and assent, even if the click box has little or no
more significance to the consumer than would purely passive disclosure of the license agreement.101
Another set of reforms appear to be directed at enabling others to
act on behalf of the principal (the party that did not prepare the contract) to control or deter the agent (the drafting party) from preparing a one-sided contract. First, the evolution of the unconscionability
doctrine may be seen as a judicial and legislative response to the inability of certain contracting parties to detect ex ante that the drafting
party prepared an unfair contract. The unconscionability doctrine is
a defense in civil litigation that may limit the enforceability of a con99. This may be due in part to the sheer volume of information disclosed in a contractual transaction. See Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 80, at 29. Bar-Gill argues accordingly
that “[h]eaps of paper blindly signed at the closing of a mortgage and the impenetrable fine
print of a credit card contract are extreme examples of disclosure regulation gone wrong.”
BAR-GILL, supra note 2, at 36. As discussed in Part III supra, very few individuals read
standard form contracts. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 671 (2011).
100. Some have suggested that mandated disclosure is applied too much and without a
proper focus. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 99, at 684.
101. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 32, at 25 (“Because information asymmetry is so prevalent in the context of deploying and receiving boilerplate, it would be problematic to assimilate the kind of nonunderstanding behavior that occurs in the context of clicking ‘I
agree’ to the ordinary conception of consent.”); Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 169, 192 n.70 (“Notwithstanding the above decisions’ emphases on such actions
[such as clicking], [l]awyers, law students, and even law professors are quick to
acknowledge that they themselves rarely read the forms they sign or the agreements they
click through on the Internet.”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Warkentine, supra
note 14, at 515) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tract or particular contractual terms.102 Even if a contract appears to
have been formed based upon the manifestation of objective consent
to the contractual promise (and the presence of consideration), the
circumstances surrounding the contract’s formation as well as the
substantive unfairness of the transaction may negate the consent’s
legal effect.103 A legal finding of unconscionability generally requires
the presence of two separate factors, substantive unconscionability
and procedural unconscionability.104 Substantive unconscionability is
based on the unfairness of the contract or a particular provision itself
(such as onerous terms); procedural unconscionability is based upon
the factors affecting the process by which consent was obtained, such
as unequal bargaining power, whether the contract was offered on a
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis, the use of “pressure” techniques to compel
signature, and certain personal characteristics of the parties such as
age and sophistication.105
These circumstances can also be understood as those that justify
permitting the principal (the non-drafting party) to avoid liability
under a contract when the agent (the drafting party) has acted
wrongfully by preparing a one-sided contract and the principal is unable to detect or prevent the agent from doing so.106 The factors underpinning a finding of procedural unconscionability generally are
relevant to the ability of the principal to detect and control the
agent’s malfeasance in the performance of a task.107 If, for example,
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2010).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981) (“Relevant factors [in
finding unconscionability] include weaknesses in the contracting process like those involved
in more specific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud, and other invalidating causes[.]”).
104. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding
Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) (“With the assistance
of contracts scholar Professor Arthur Leff, courts employing section 2-302 quickly developed a two-part analytical structure for the doctrine, which involves analysis of both ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ unconscionability.”). In some cases, however, all that is needed
for a finding of unconscionability is one of the two “types.” Id. at 19 (finding that a “growing
minority of courts have applied a ‘single-prong’ approach to the doctrine, under which extreme evidence of one type of unconscionability alone is used to justify an overall finding of
unconscionability, without inquiry into the second prong”).
105. This analysis is obviously applicable to standard form contracts, where contracts
are often not read or difficult to read. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of
Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetititve Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 984 (2006)
(noting that “courts are suspicious of [consumer standard form contracts] and sometimes
find them unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability”); Hillman & Rachlinski,
supra note 45, at 457 (“When a form contract contains incomprehensible boilerplate, fine
print, or otherwise hidden terms that undermine the user’s purpose of contracting or otherwise ‘shock the conscience,’ courts unhesitatingly apply unconscionability.”).
106. Indeed, Warkentine specifically notes that the lack of consumer sophistication or
access to counsel is important to a finding of unconscionability with respect to standard
form contracts. Warkentine, supra note 14, at 483.
107. This can be justified both in terms of information and control asymmetries. Gillette explains that “[l]egal defenses to enforcement of contract terms, such as unconsciona-
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the parties have relatively unequal bargaining power, then the drafting party (the agent and presumably the party with superior bargaining power) will be able to prepare a one-sided contract without the
ability of the other party (the principal) from detecting or counteracting such preparation. Similarly, if the contract is offered to the principal (the party that did not prepare the contract) on a “take-it-orleave-it” basis, then the principal will be unable to change or modify
any one-sided contractual provisions, even if detected by the principal.108
Unconscionability has been largely unsuccessful in policing consent concerns because of factors that can be understood from an
agency perspective.109 To the extent that a standard is not set forth in
a statute and is developed through common law (such as with unconscionability), the application of the standard necessarily represents a
sort of ad hoc decision-making by the judge as to whether the agent
did a good job. There is no empirical evidence, for example, that judges make “good” unconscionability decisions or the existence of a
standard against which unconscionability decisions could be measured. From an economic agency perspective, this suggests that the
“agency costs” associated with the use of courts or legislative action
are high relative to the effectiveness or benefit of engaging such additional monitors of drafting party’s actions.
Because unconscionability requires courts to make a subjective
determination in each instance where the defense is raised, such determinations “have little value as precedents.”110 The “fact sensitive”
nature of each decision means that neither agents (drafting parties)
nor principals (non-drafting parties) can anticipate in advance
whether a particular contract or contract term will be enforceable.111
The drafting party, when drafting, has to assess the likelihood of particular contractual features being detected or attacked as unconscionable (which may be doubtful) as well as a particular judge debility, are consistent with this argument, insofar as application of the defenses typically
depend on the drafters’ possession of information that adherents to the contracts lack.”
Gillette, supra note 41, at 117. Bar-Gill, on the other hand, implies that control of contract
design by the drafting party may be the more relevant factor. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at
1423 n.211.
108. Consumers engaged in occasional purchases often have difficulty evaluating “selfserving contract terms” prepared by repeat sellers. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 680.
109. Scholars have noted the difficulty in demonstrating the factors that comprise unconscionability. See Lonegrass, supra note 104, at 45 (“Because strong evidence of procedural deficiency has historically been required to justify judicial intervention, courts employing a conventional approach are unlikely to find the procedural prong satisfied in the
absence of multiple factors traditionally associated with lack of choice . . . .”); Warkentine,
supra note 14, at 472 (“[A]n unconscionability approach requires the challenging party to
meet the extremely high burden of showing a serious defect in the bargaining
process . . . . Most plaintiffs will have a hard time making the necessary showing.”).
110. Warkentine, supra note 14, at 484.
111. Id.
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termining that such term is in fact unconscionable. Given that many
of these adjudicative determinations, whether in arbitration or otherwise, may be made on a one-off basis, there is little to deter drafting parties from being as aggressive as possible with respect to drafting standard form contracts. To the extent that a particular contract
with a consumer is successfully attacked, that does not mean that the
drafting party will not enjoy the benefits of the contract made with
all other similarly situated consumers (who do not contest the contract).
C.

Reforms Suggested by Economic Theory

Economic theory indicates that there is another way in which the
principal-agent problem can be addressed in the contract preparation
context. This method would involve realigning the incentives and interests of the agent with those of the principal.112 As discussed above,
it is the differing interests of the parties that result in the incentives
for the agent to perform in a way that is most favorable to the agent
and to conceal from the principal the deficiencies in such performance. To date, however, most contractual reforms are explicitly or
implicitly based on improving the ability of the principal to monitor
or empowering others to monitor agents to determine whether agents
have performed properly or legally. These reforms focus on the principal’s ability to control and not the agent’s underlying incentives to
perform at a lower level and to conceal deficiencies. By focusing on
the agent’s incentives, contract law reforms would better be able to
address the relationship structure that inherently provides the agent
with more control.
An example of altering the focus from the principal’s information
level to that of the agent’s incentives can be seen in the employment
context. In this instance, a business owner (the principal) may have
delegated certain duties or tasks to her employees (the agents). To
prevent the employees from shirking or taking private benefits, the
owner may attempt to monitor the employees or employ others, such
as managers, to monitor. The effort to alleviate the information
asymmetry is expended by the principal (or others on behalf of the
principal), and the agent’s underlying incentives and interests are
not fundamentally addressed, except to the extent that the agent is
concerned about detection. In contrast, by setting up profit-sharing
arrangements such that the agent is entitled to additional compensa112. These would include the incentive to perform better as well as to share information. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 26, at 308 (“The principal can limit divergences
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent . . . [that are] designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.”); Milena Popović et al., The Agency
Dilemma: Information Asymmetry in the “Principal-Agent” Problem, 62 J. THEORY & PRAC.
MGMT. 13, 13-14 (2012) (describing economic literature regarding creating incentives to
share privately-held information and initiating information-gathering strategies).
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tion if the business performs well, the principal directly addresses
the agent’s incentives and interests and diminishes one of the fuels
for the principal-agent problem.113 The agent will now be incentivized
to perform at the level desired by the principal to help the business
perform well so that the agent is entitled to additional compensation.
Since the underlying interests of the agent do not conflict with those
of the principal, the principal presumably does not need to monitor
the agent as much because the information asymmetry (that still exists) between the two parties has been mooted.
The issue now is how to apply these sorts of incentive structures
to the contract preparation context. It is difficult to imagine a compensatory scheme whereby non-drafting parties would pay drafting
parties based on whether the overall contract appeared as the nondrafting party would desire. As described elsewhere, part of the issue
in the contract preparation context is that the non-drafting party often is not in a position to determine whether the drafting party has
prepared a desirable contract.114 Unlike the business situation, the
agent’s performance cannot be linked directly to the principal’s success because the principal’s success (possessing a desirable contract
from the drafting party’s perspective) is inevitably in conflict with the
agent’s success (possessing a desirable contract from the non-drafting
party’s perspective).
Nevertheless, there are related incentives of the agent that can be
addressed. In the employment context, the employee may have an
incentive not only to shirk but also the incentive to conceal the deficiencies in the performance. A profit-sharing approach addresses the
former, which correspondingly eliminates the concern about the latter. In the contract preparation context, however, it is difficult to address the incentive for poor performance.
Instead, the focus in the contract preparation context should be on
altering the drafting party’s incentives to conceal the deficient performance, even if that means not attempting to realign the drafting
party’s incentives to do so. There may be mechanisms that act as an
information-sharing device by placing the burden of disclosing poor
performance on the agent instead of placing the burden on the principal to detect poor performance. Accordingly, this Article is searching for devices that alter the drafting party’s incentives to hide poor
113. By conditioning the agent’s compensation based on an observable outcome, the
principal can influence the agent’s performance. See SALANIÉ, supra note 19, at 107. This
assumes, however, that the agent is willing to assume the risk associated with not achieving the desired outcome. See Eisenhardt, supra note 9, at 61. Moreover, it may be difficult
to “envision, create, and enforce specific agent outcomes.” Gregory Dawson et al., Information Asymmetry in Information Systems Consulting: Toward a Theory of Relationship
Constraints, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 143, 151 (2011).
114. See infra Part II.D.
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performance and thereby permit the non-drafting party to determine
when and how the drafting party has made effective disclosure.
It may be argued that existing reforms such as mandated disclosure or unconscionability are in some respects an attempt to realign
the incentives of the non-drafting party to conceal deficient performance.115 If the drafting party (the agent) wants to receive the benefits of a particular provision or contract, then the drafting party
needs to ensure that the contract complies with the regulation or that
the other party to the contract is aware of and able to negotiate the
provision. The agent, in other words, is incentivized to share the information regarding the one-sided nature of the contract with the
principal. If the other party to the contract accepts the one-sided nature of the contract after an opportunity to negotiate or reject the
contract, then the drafting party will be able to enjoy the benefits of
the one-sided contract without fear of a court rejecting the contract
(because of a defense like unconscionability or unfair surprise). Thus,
courts and legislatures may attempt to address the principal-agent
problem in contract drafting by aligning the interests of the parties.
These approaches, however, do not actually alter the incentives of
the agent to conceal a deficient performance.116 The burden is on the
principal to argue that the performance was deficient and should not
be respected from a legal standpoint. Next, the agent is only incentivized to prepare a contract sufficient to convince a judge after the fact
that the contract was prepared adequately, if the agent anticipates
the court actually determining that adequate disclosure was not
made.117 As discussed above, there are significant reasons to doubt
the ability of adjudicators and legislatures in determining when effective disclosure has been made when such assessments are made
on an ad hoc basis, and neither adjudicators nor legislatures have an
economic incentive to ensure effective disclosure. Accordingly, the
drafting party may only be concerned with appearances for the adjudicator’s sake, not the non-drafting party’s.118
115. Ayres and Schwartz come very close to using agency language in describing this
situation: “Consumer protection law responds to the [assumption of risk] doctrine by attempting to induce firms to create a real opportunity for consumers to read.”
Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 91, at 549.
116. Ben-Shahar and Schneider document ways in which mandated disclosure may be
resisted or undermined by drafting parties. As they note, “an enterprise that unscrupulously withholds information before a mandate might well continue to do so afterward.” BenShahar & Schneider, supra note 99, at 698. Similarly, disclosing parties can technically
comply with the mandate but undermine the purpose of meaningful disclosure. Id. at 701.
117. I have argued elsewhere that adjudicators’ impressions regarding the contract
process and context can be exploited through strategic contract design. Zacks, supra note
101, at 180.
118. This assumes that contract drafters are even worried at all about what adjudicators might do in response to a failure to comply with mandated disclosure requirements.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 99, at 701 (“Do evaders risk trouble? If, like
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A different reform to address the agent’s incentive to conceal deficient performance is shifting the burden of proof of performance onto
the agent. In this instance, the proof of performance would be
demonstrating that the contracts were not drafted in such a way as
to conceal the terms in question, or put affirmatively, that the contracts were drafted sufficiently so as to be understood by the contract
recipient or the general pool of contract recipients.119
Under such an approach, drafting parties will need to ensure that
their contractual provisions are sufficiently understandable or else
face the risk that they would not be enforced.120 An important benefit
of this approach is that by reducing the incentive of the agent to conceal a deficient performance, the principal will now be in a better position to detect a deficient performance. Instead of the legislature
having to determine what constitutes adequate disclosure or a court
or non-drafting party having to assess whether the drafting party
acted appropriately with respect to disclosure, the drafting party will
essentially perform that task for them.121
By reducing the incentive to conceal one-sided provisions, the
drafting party would be expected to make better disclosure. The
drafting party will be motivated to make effective disclosure, particuHolmes’s bad man, they ask what ‘courts are likely to do in fact,’ they generally answer ‘not
much.’ ”). If they are, then perhaps the contract can be drafted to “provide attributional
‘clues’ that inform and reassure judicial interpreters that a particular contracting party is
more blameworthy than another.” Zacks, supra note 101, at 171.
119. This could be applied to different types of standard form contracts. For example:
[T]he terms of a credit card agreement would be deemed to be unenforceable
unless the Issuer could establish that the Holder was (or should have been)
aware and understood the significance of the applicable terms at the time the
credit card agreement was executed. . . . Issuers also would be permitted to establish that the interest rate was disclosed such that Holder understood it, or
to lessen the impact of a subjective standard, that a credit card holder in Holder’s situation would reasonably be expected to understand it.
Zacks, supra note 3, at 1506. Others have argued for a purely subjective approach, meaning that the drafting party herself (as opposed to members of a cohort) would have to
demonstrate that the non-drafting party actually understood the term. See, e.g., Warkentine, supra note 14, at 473 (describing her proposal for a “knowing assent” requirement,
including that “the importance of [the] term be explained so that the adhering party understands its significance”).
120. Again in the credit card contract context, I have argued that “altering the presumption of enforceability of credit card agreement with respect to pricing and cost terms
incentivizes [credit card] Issuers to make better and more complete disclosure of the material terms of credit card agreements.” Zacks, supra note 3, at 1509.
121. This is a superior method relative to relying on regulators to figure out what type
of disclosure to require and to do so effectively. Ben-Shahar and Schneider suggest “it is
the regulatory dynamic of this institution [mandated disclosure]—the desire to solve too
many problems by informing unsophisticated decisionmakers and expecting them to make
affirmative thoughtful decisions—that undermines the system.” Ben-Shahar & Schneider,
supra note 99, at 745.
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larly to the extent that the drafting party actually values a particular
one-sided provision, in which instance the drafting party will be motivated to receive the benefit of the one-sided provision by ensuring
effective disclosure.
In general, this approach may be subject to the same criticisms as
described above for unconscionability, specifically that adjudicators
would be making determinations of what constitutes adequate disclosure on an ad hoc and perhaps inconsistent basis. What distinguishes
this approach from other legislative or judicial responses is the
standard against which the disclosure would be measured. Since the
presumption would be that contractual terms are not enforceable in
the absence of effective disclosure, the general deference that courts
give to contracts under the traditional duty to read would be removed. In addition, the court’s inquiry would be limited to determining the adequacy of disclosure instead of multiple factors such as the
substantive fairness (as in the case of substantive unconscionability)
or whether the non-disclosing party reasonably should have expected
a particular term (as in the case of the doctrine of “reasonable
expectations”).122
Moreover, courts should also be limited to ascertaining whether a
majority of consumers would have understood the contract term in
question. Accordingly, the drafting party could demonstrate it had
met its burden by establishing as an empirical matter that the contract terms were understandable by most parties in the non-drafting
party’s situation (such as being a consumer). An example of utilizing
this evidentiary approach is suggested by Ayres and Schwartz, who
propose requiring the drafting party to make effective disclosure of
unexpected contract terms by demonstrating through empirical studies that a majority of consumers who read the disclosure in the required
warning format regarding unexpected terms also understand them.123
Ayres and Schwartz suggest using a “cautionary standardized
box” required by the Federal Trade Commission in which all deviations from the consumers’ established expectations would be disclosed.124 As a threshold matter, although there is some evidence that
utilizing a simple format works, the suggestion that a box is ideal
should be rejected, particularly in the absence of empirical evidence

122. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §211 provides that “[w]here the [drafter]
has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent [to the contract] would not do
so if he [or she] knew that the writing contained a particular term, [that] term is not part
of the agreement.” Ayres and Schwartz, supra note 97, at 559 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining
what consumers expect is difficult for courts. See id. at 560.
123. Ayres and Schwartz, supra note 97, at 584.
124. Id. at 580.
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that it is the most effective format.125 Instead, the burden should remain upon the drafting parties to demonstrate empirically that the
disclosure was effective, including through the use of the format of
disclosure chosen. It is possible that there is a more effective format
for disclosure of unexpected or material contract terms that is only
discoverable through empirical testing.
Drafting parties should be encouraged to develop and to continue
to develop effective means of disclosures. To the extent that a particular format or manner of disclosure becomes stale with overuse,
drafting parties would be forced to come up with new methods. In
addition, it would be a competitive advantage to have a superior contractual disclosure mechanism because fewer contracts of the particular seller would be unenforceable. As a result, one could imagine
sellers competing on this particular dimension and developing better
formats and disclosure features, and it does not make sense to imagine that the ideal format is already known. This completely upends
the current regime, which in some sense encourages a race to the bottom and under which sellers may be penalized in the marketplace to
the extent that they do not exploit consumers through their contracts
as much as possible.126
In any event, an approach based on empirical determinations of
effective disclosure addresses the drafting party’s incentives as well
as the limitations of outside monitoring agents to determine what
constitutes effective disclosure. Rather than making a subjective determination of whether contractual terms were effectively disclosed,
the adjudicator would assess the data and methodology used by the
preparing party to determine that a particular contract term was effectively disclosed.127 Drafting parties would be unable to defend
125. In defense of their suggestion for a “warning box,” Ayres and Schwartz note that
prior “findings imply that disclosure information, in a clear and simple format, may have a
positive effect on decisions.” Id. at 553 n.25 (citing Vanessa G. Perry & Pamela M. Blumenthal, Understanding the Fine Print: The Need for Effective Testing of Mandatory Mortgage
Loan Disclosures, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y. & MKTG. 305, 307 (2012)). Ayres and Schwartz suggest
that using the same format for all types of consumer contracts will “facilitate consumer
learning and also comparison shopping when several sellers are available.” Id. at 583.
126. Hanson and Kysar argue in an earlier work that competition forces sellers to exploit cognitive biases to their advantage. They suggest:
[O]ne might say that the evolutionary forces of the market will force the parties
in the dominant position to behave ‘as if’ they know and understand how best
to use the teachings of the behavioral literature to manipulate other actors for
gain. . . . Manufacturers, to survive, must behave ‘as if’ they are attempting to
manipulate consumer risk perceptions.
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 747 (1999).
127. Ayres and Schwartz suggest that this is the proper approach as well, warning that
“[c]ourts . . . should not engage in free-floating assessment of whether the disclosure is
comprehensible.” Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 97, at 584. Instead, courts should attempt
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standard form contracts simply as they appeared, but instead would
have to utilize resources to determine and defend particular
disclosures.
Under an approach that places the burden of demonstrating effective disclosure upon the drafting party, the drafting party will be
forced to determine the materiality and importance of various contractual terms. It probably is impossible to make effective disclosure
to a consumer of all of the terms that are contained in a ten-page
standard form contract. Consumers would no longer be forced to
make the impossible assessment of which terms are important, and
instead drafting parties will need to make determinations as to
which terms are valuable enough to justify spending resources to determine how to make effective disclosure of such terms. Terms that
are not as valuable will be ignored and disclosed ineffectively (and,
consequently, not enforced) or deleted from the contract. Moreover, to
the extent that the inclusion of additional unimportant terms impedes consumer understanding of other material terms, drafting parties should be expected to remove immaterial terms or terms that
match statutory default terms.
It may be, as discussed in Part III, that consumers simply will not
read or understand particular types of disclosures. In such circumstances, to the extent that drafting parties are unable to find a way
in which to make effective disclosure, such terms should be disallowed. If meaningful consent to particular terms cannot be achieved
because of the nature or biases of consumers regardless of the form of
disclosure, then such terms should not be deemed assented to regardless of how clear or conspicuous the disclosure may appear on an ex
post basis.
This is not to suggest, however, that all terms that cannot be effectively disclosed will be unenforceable. For example, the drafting
party might be permitted to demonstrate empirically that particular
terms match the expectations of the non-drafting parties, in which
case such term would be enforceable.128 There is little danger in enforcing terms that the consumer expects. It is only when the nondrafting party cannot, either because of ineffective disclosure or otherwise, understand the contractual terms that such terms would not
to make an “objective validation of the disclosure’s impact on consumers’ ability to describe
correctly the terms of the contract.” Id.
128. Ayres and Schwartz suggest that only unexpected terms need to be regulated by
requiring drafting parties to demonstrate effective disclosure and assent to such terms.
Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 91, at 552 (“The law of contractual assent, we argue, best
implements this goal [of making ‘party assent real’] by permitting firms to enforce even
poorly disclosed or hidden terms if consumers expect and understand what those terms do
while regulating only those terms that consumers incorrectly believe are more favorable to
them than they actually are.”).
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be enforced. By changing presumptions of enforceability and requiring the agent to deploy resources to demonstrate effective disclosure,
the agent’s interests in achieving effective disclosure match those of
the principal, and the imbalance in control in the underlying transactions can start to be addressed as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The economic analysis of the agency relationship that exists in the
contract preparation context is instructive as to understanding the
behavior of contracting parties, contract law doctrine concerning legal consent to contract, and possible contract law reforms. Understanding the structural principal-agent problem involved in preparing contracts is fundamental to comprehending why particular contracts appear as they do as well as to determining when particular
contractual doctrines should be applied. This Article has explored the
ways in which principals and agents act and respond in different contract preparation contexts as well as various legislative and
judicial responses.
As explained in this Article, the principal-agent problem manifests itself because drafting parties can, in certain instances, prepare
contracts in a manner that serves the drafting party’s interests at the
expense of the non-drafting party’s interests. In certain contexts, contracts may actually embody or entrench a principal-agent problem,
which is almost directly opposed to the understanding of contracts as
helping to address the problem as it exists between two promising
parties. As such, contract preparation (and execution) is not necessarily a solution to asymmetries of interests, information, and control. It is the tool used to exploit the asymmetries and in fact embodies the asymmetries.
We have a discomfort about contracts that rely on consent where
we know empirically that one side has not read the provisions and is
being forced in some sense to agree to a contract that it cannot and
will not negotiate. We have developed theories about unconscionability and unfair surprise, and we even have established federal and
state watchdog agencies to help protect those who are not in a position to enter into a classical contract.
Nevertheless, the tension arises because of the duty to read, which
if imposed to its logical ends, would swallow unconscionability and
unfair surprise. Somewhere along the line, we acknowledged
(through the work of Llewellyn and others) that the duty to read
could not actually be logically realized in all situations given the bargaining power disparities between the parties and the actual contracts that existed in the world. To some, this encouraged the development of theories about the reasonable expectations of the parties
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and legal fictions about blanket assent, which purport to address the
problem but are unsatisfying because they never directly solve our
concern about contracts that are prepared with the knowledge that
the other side will not have a chance to read them and will not in fact
read them.
Solutions to date have been to focus on the flow of information
from the drafting party to the non-drafting party, as required ex ante
by statutory rules about the type and manner of disclosures and ex
post by judges about the propriety of the contracting process. These
approaches have ultimately proven unsatisfying because they do not
address the fundamental incentives of the drafting party to conceal.
Instead, these approaches attempt to diagnose the symptoms that
arise from such incentives and curtail the symptoms. If the font size
being used by drafting parties is too small, then perhaps the statute
may require a larger font, or the judge may find that the provision
was unconscionable.
As a result, the monitors are always playing from behind and unable to anticipate the next wave of contract drafting techniques. If,
for example, the rule requiring drafting parties to demonstrate the
salience and understanding of terms had applied when drafting parties began introducing click-screen agreements, then perhaps litigation outcomes would have been based on informed consent rather
than judges’ ad hoc assessments of what a “click” actually means to a
consumer purchasing something on the Internet. In some sense,
while legislatures and judges are currently trying to figure out the
legitimacy of current practices based upon a presumption of validity,
companies are already evolving to find new methods of strategic
drafting. Without new approaches that recognize and appreciate the
lessons from principal-agent framework as it applies to the contract
preparation context, contract law reforms will continue to be churned
out in a retrospective and ultimately ineffective fashion.
There are approaches that incorporate lessons from economic theory and, consequently, could prove more successful than previous reforms. Reforms to date have not forced drafting parties to ascertain
the most effective methods of disclosure and instead have relied on
piecemeal determinations by courts and legislatures. These reforms
have not addressed the underlying incentives of the drafting party
(the agent) to obfuscate or use ineffective disclosure methods. Reforms based in economic theory, such as reversing the presumption of
enforceability in the absence of empirical data, would address these
incentives and force drafting parties to do a cost-benefit analysis with
respect to making effective disclosure, and receiving the benefit, of
each contractual term. In future work I hope to explore other reforms
suggested by economic agency theory that may prove effective in the
contract-drafting context. By recognizing and applying lessons from
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economic agency, contract law reforms can be designed to achieve the
desired goal of meaningful assent.

